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Under existing standards, then, the courts may narrow their review
to satisfy the demands for administrative discretion, and they may
broaden it close to the point of substituting their judgment for that
of the administrative agency.1
After fifty years ... we have yet to agree on how this review should
operate in practice. We are still struggling with where to draw the
line between obsequious deference and intrusive scrutiny.2
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of calibrating the breadth-or scope-of judicial
review over fact finding by administrative agencies is ultimately
to allocate decision-making responsibility between the executive
and judicial branches. Because Congress usually makes these
decisions, all three branches have a stake in the process. In
assigning oversight responsibilities, Congress makes a choice: it
weighs the desire for efficient and timely agency action against the
need to ensure consistent and fair decision making. In balancing
these considerations, Congress intends factual support for agency
decisions to be subject to varying levels of scrutiny or, on occasion,
to be free from scrutiny.3 Straightforward enough, one would think.
Yet, as the introductory quotes suggest, after all these years,
1. REPORT OF TIE COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., APPOINTED BY THE ATry GEN., AT THE
REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, TO INVESTIGATE THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM IN VARIOUS
ADMIN. TRIBUNALS AND TO SUGGEST IMPROVEMENTS THEREIN, S. DoC. No. 77-8, at 91 (1941)
[hereinafter 1941 ADMIN. PROC. REPORT]. This report has long been hailed for its insights into
the administrative process.
2. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 258 (1996).
3. When agency decisions are free from scrutiny, they are not subject to judicial review;
in terms of this Article, their affirmance rate would be 100%. Situations of agency
nonreviewability are infrequent and disfavored. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414,433 (1944) (denying judicial review in criminal enforcement proceedings). But see Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (criticizing
Yakus as "ambiguous" and distinguishing it as a wartime measure); see also Paul R. Verkuil,
Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REv. 733 (1983). The
subject of nonreviewability is beyond the scope of this Article, except to note that Congress'
instructions in this regard are still followed by the courts unless the Constitution dictates
otherwise. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001) ("A construction of the amendments
at issue that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give
rise to substantial constitutional questions.").
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reviewing judges are still struggling to make sense of these
standards, especially as they apply to scope of review of facts or of
law and policy."
I. SCOPE OF REVIEW
It is doubtful that Congress wants scope of review to be an
irrelevant labeling exercise. Instead, one might reasonably expect
that Congress wants outcomes, defined in terms of affirmances,
remands, and reversals of agency actions, to vary according to the
scope of review standard chosen (or at least to find some judicial
recognition of these expectations). But it seems the outcomes
question is rarely asked and its premise remains unexamined.
To explore the relationship of outcomes to standards, this Article
makes a preliminary attempt to measure outcomes against the
relevant scope of review provisions. This "outcomes analysis" pro-
duces some intriguing correlations between results and formulas,
along with some surprises that themselves serve to raise more
questions. Although such an exercise can never produce total
agreement about how scope of review standards should operate, it
facilitates a better understanding of why Congress differentiates
among these standards and why the lesson sometimes is lost on the
courts.
A. The Art of Scope of Review
Think of the word "scope" in "scope of review" as a contraction of
"telescope." Like a telescope, scope of review offers either a narrow
aperture to limit the breadth ofjudicial scrutiny, thereby increasing
the area of agency discretion, or a wider lens to expand judicial
oversight, thereby decreasing agency discretion. Once Congress
supplies the lens,5 the courts and agencies must try to bring
4. Scope of review of questions of law and policy are also a challenging exercise, but it
is at least one that has received extensive judicial analysis. See infra notes 28, 86, and
accompanying text (discussing the Chevron doctrine). By contrast, scope of review over facts,
including application of law to facts, remains a neglected activity.
5. Of course, Congress does not always supply a lens. Statutes are sometimes silent on
scope of review, or indeed on review at all. In those situations, the courts, by adopting a
presumption of reviewability, will provide the standard of review. The 1941 Attorney
General's Report on Administrative Procedure explains:
682 [Vol. 44:679
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Congress' intended level ofjudicial scrutiny into focus. This exercise
inevitably produces margins that are fuzzy and obscure. After all,
the object being observed is not easy to contemplate: instead of
viewing a beautiful sunset, the judge's eyes are cast upon a mind-
numbing pile of documents.
Moreover, unlike, say, a National Football League official uti-
lizing "instant replay" to review a play challenged on the field, the
reviewing judge is looking at an event that occurred years earlier
which has few clear guideposts. When "field judges" are told by the
National Football League not to reverse a play unless the call is
"clearly wrong," the process might be expected to generate a fairly
predictable reversal rate.6 But even in the limited world of sports
not all calls are automatic. In baseball, for example, umpires
regularly make controversial calls with far less consistency than one
might imagine.7 Few reviewing functions, it seems, are routine,
automatic, or bland.'
Like the area ofjudicial review, the extent to which administrative action within
that area will be subjected to judicial scrutiny is also largely determined by court
decisions. The courts developed standards as to the scope ofjudicial review when
legislation did not provide them. To a large extent, subsequent legislation
dealing with the matter has either enacted the judicially formulated standards
or has been so interpreted by the courts that no difference resulted.
1941 ADMIN. PROC. REPORT, supra note 1, at 87. The classic judicial articulation of the
presumption of reviewability is Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
6. An estimated thirty-five percent of the reviewed calls are reversed. See Mike Sando,
Return of Instant Replay Not Off to Good Start, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 28, 1999,
at C4. But even National Football League fieldjudges have varying "reversal rates" that must
be calculated by coaches when they decide to risk a challenge, the failure of which can cost
them an often crucial time-out. See Jarrett Bell, Replay Will be Strategy: Challenges Become
Coach's Tool, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 1999, at C3.
7. Concerning the newly revised strike zone, one commentator observed: "The reality is
no one even knows if umpires will call pitches the way they have been instructed." Murray
Chass, Calling Pitches By the Book Won't Be Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2001, at D1. In an
effort to speed up the game, Major League Baseball ordered umpires to call more strikes, or
more precisely, to limit the total pitch count to 270 per game. See Murray Chass, Call More
Strikes, Umpires are Told, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,2001, at D1. Responding to the ensuing outcry
by purists, within days Major League Baseball reversed course and agreed not to use pitch
counts to measure umpire performance, and the controversy dissipated. See Murray Chass,
Baseball Retreats in Dispute Over Umpires'Pitch Counts, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2001, at D1.
The issue remains who should decide what the strike zone is, i.e., who defines "what is good
for the game." See infra Part III.A. (comparing this issue to the Social Security
Administration's (SSA) efforts to control Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversal rates and
average caseloads).
8. Perhaps the court in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), erred when it famously refused to permit
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Unlike the field judge, the appellate judge does not get freeze
frames of the action below. And, unlike the field judge and the
umpire,9 the appellate judge does not get to view the same situation
over and over again. Instead, he or she is presented with a
constantly changing stack of papers that help advocates reconstruct
the action below. Depending on the type of agency action under
review, this record may be formal and contain a written decision
with transcripts, exhibits, briefs, and other submissions, or it may
be informal, and contain things like letters or notations rejecting
a request or imposing obligations. In most circumstances, the
appellate judge lacks a clear view of the action below.
Once the court receives the agency record and hears arguments,
it must apply the relevant scope of review standard. But scope is
one dimension, intensity another. Although Congress usually es-
tablishes scope, the Supreme Court traditionally determines how
close or hard the courts must look in a given situation. The Court's
directions are often complicated and sometimes inconsistent. For
example, one well-known formulation combines a "narrow" scope
of review standard with a "searching" inquiry.' And sometimes the
Court infuses the arbitrary and capricious standard with a "hard
look" requirement."
These instructions test a reviewer's mental and visual dexterity.
The judge must be an omniscient observer but not an omnivorous
decision maker. In effect, the reviewer often must see, but yet
suspend judgment.' This tension forces a judge to live in a dual
administrative agencies to behave like umpires "blandly calling balls and strikes." Id. at 620
(refusing to let the Federal Power Commission (FPC) play the seemingly passive role of an
umpire in dealing with the environment).
9. Umpires are given a defined strike zone but often have difficulty locating it
consistently, at least according to players and managers. In this circumstance it is consistency
that is sought, not some manifestation of the ideal strike zone. See Dave Anderson, The Poison
Threatening The Umpires, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2001, at D1 (quoting Ted Williams, who "once
described consistency as 'the one necessary ingredient' for a home plate umpire").
10. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Court
rejected the application of the substantial evidence test and de novo review in favor of the less
stringent arbitrary and capricious review. Even under this narrow standard, however, the
Court required "probing, in depth review." Id. at 415. But see 2 KENNrH CuLp DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.5 (3d ed. 1994) (arguing that "the
Overton Park opinion overstated the requirements of the arbitrary and capricious test").
11. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,42-
44(1983).
12. In a way the reviewing judge is being asked to perform the literary task of engaging
684 [Vol. 44:679
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reality, not unlike what jurors must do when a trial judge instructs
them to disregard what they have seen or heard."3 Presumably
reviewing judges are more adept at this task than jurors, but it still
requires a talent for the interpretative role. This is one reason why
judicial review is more art than science.
B. The Administrative Procedure Act as a Guide
Mental balancing acts for reviewing judges come with the
territory. In drafting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
scope of review provisions Congress sought to bring order to the
oversight function. 4 In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 5 the
Court struggled to infuse the APA's substantial evidence test with
predictive powers. Justice Frankfurter instructed the circuit courts
uniformly to consider the fact finding role of the hearing examiner,
6
but he remained skeptical of judges' ability to carry out this
instruction. Judges, he memorably warned, were not "automata."7
In effect, he discounted in advance the probability that instructions
on scope of review, even instructions sent twice to the best circuit in
the land, would yield consistent results.
in a "willing suspension of disbelief." That phrase, coined by Samuel Coleridge, asks the
reader to transfer from his "inward nature" a "semblance of truth" to sustain the poetic
moment. See J.A. CUDDON, A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS AND LIERARY THEORY 1044 (3d
ed. 1991).
13. Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated
Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 345, 351-52 (1973) (analyzing jury
simulation research and finding that judgments of mock jurors are often influenced by
evidence the judge instructs them to disregard).
14. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
15. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
16. In Universal Camera, the Court reversed the Second Circuit's application of the
substantial evidence standard for inadequately crediting the hearing examiner's conclusions
on witness credibility. Id. at 496. On remand, Judge Frank sought to correct the analysis by
distinguishing between primary inferences of fact, such as witness demeanor, and secondary
inferences of fact. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank,
J., concurring).
17. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 489. Of course, not all scholars feel that the scope of
review standards are unworkable. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 10, § 11.2 (noting that
substantial evidence review "has been among the most stable and satisfactory features of our
system of administrative law").
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Scope of review remains unpredictable and contentious. Consider
the recent decision in Easley v. Cromartie," in which the Supreme
Court split five-to-four regarding the meaning and application of the
clearly erroneous standard.19 Because clearly erroneous is an even
more familiar standard than substantial evidence, one wonders how
the Justices can divide so evenly over its application. Fifty years
after Universal Camera, the Supreme Court still has great difficulty
leading the way.
Once the Court put aside any theory of mechanical application,
scope of review doctrine seems to have suffered from benign neglect.
Rather than locating guideposts between mechanical application
and freelancing, courts and commentators have largely abandoned
the field.2° With Congress unsure of what to do next, all options
remain open. Evaluation of outcomes may help to sharpen differ-
ences among the various conceptually distinct but empirically
muddled review standards and, by so doing, regain doctrinal clarity.
The Court has acted in related contexts where outcomes have been
affected through judicially controlled guidelines, such as scope of
review over questions of law and policy.2
Courts and scholars have simply not devoted comparable
attention to the interpretation of scope of review standards relating
to facts. Instead, explanation of how these standards work has been
relegated to the realm of "inarticulate" decision factors that are said
to defy rules of consistency.22 Combining these subjective factors
18. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
19. In Cromartie, the Court divided over the question whether the three judge panel's
decision to set aside North Carolina's legislative redistricting boundaries was a violation of
the "clearly erroneous" standard of review when race was a "predominant" motive in creating
the districts. Id. at 259-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20. Perhaps the best (certainly the most pithy) description of academic abdication is the
observation "that the rules governing judicial review have no more substance at the core than
a seedless grape." Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 771, 780 (1975).
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. The 1941 Attorney General's Report lists these "inarticulate" factors:
In exercising their powers of review, the courts have been influenced, it is
commonly thought, by a variety of inarticulate factors: The character of the
administrative agency, the nature of the problems with which it deals, the
nature and consequences of the administrative action, the confidence which the
agency has won, the degree to which the review would interfere with the
agency's functions or burden the courts, the nature of the proceedings before the
administrative agency, and similar factors.
[Vol. 44:679
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with more objective outcomes assessments is the focus of this
Article. This need not be a controversial undertaking. The scope
of judicial review of facts is far less politically charged than
substantive review of informal rulemaking, 3 or review of pure
questions of law or policy.2' By turning even a portion of the energy
the Court expends on those decisions to scope of review over
questions of fact may produce a better understood and improved
scope of review doctrine.
C. Congressionally Defined Scope of Review Standards
The key phrases used to define the appropriate scope of review
are well known. They derive from the APA or from various agency
-specific review statutes. In shorthand form, they are: arbitrary and
capricious, substantial evidence, clearly erroneous, and de novo.25
1941 ADMIN. PROC. REPORT, supra note 1, at 91.
23. Scope of review provisions take on a whole different dimension when they are applied
to informal rulemaking. Rulemaking reversal rates in the District of Columbia Circuit, for
example, range between 40-50% under narrow scope of review standards such as arbitrary'
and capricious, which far exceeds the reversal percentages hypothesized in this Article. See
Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?,
67 S. CAL. L. REv. 621,636-38 (1994). Interestingly, policymaking through adjudication seems
to fare better on review than policymaking through rulemaking. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit
and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 301; see also Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of
Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051, 1065-68 (1995) (describing the difficulties of
applying arbitrary and capricious review to agency law and policy decisions).
24. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GRO. L.J. 833,836 (2001) (suggesting
that Chevron's hegemony over deference to agency interpretations of law should not be so
complete as to obscure the "venerable decision" of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944)); see also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (denying Chevron deference
to U.S. Customs Service ruling letters on various grounds, but granting ruling letters the
"eligibl[ity] to claim respect according to its persuasiveness' under Skidmore).
25. Section 706 of the APA provides that a court may
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law; ...
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); see also Veterans Judicial Review Act, 38 U.S.C. § 7261(aX4) (2000)
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These four standards are listed in "telescopic" order, from narrow to
wide scope or breadth.26 Congress creates these standards to invite
narrow to wide judicial oversight of administrative action, or,
alternatively, wide to narrow deference to agency action.27 Indeed,
under de novo review, there should be no deference at all.2"
Judicial attempts to interpret these standards accept the
above progression, but they do not dictate a deference scale. These
standards might be thought of as a kind of grading curve set
by Congress. Under this approach, the arbitrary and capricious
standard, the narrowest review, is equivalent to pass/fail,' a grade
intended to produce a high pass rate. The substantial evidence and
clearly erroneous tests, the middle standards, translate into "C" or
"B" grades where most appeals might be expected to result in
affirmances. De novo review, the toughest standard, is more like an
"A" grade where one might expect fewer cases to survive judicial
scrutiny.30
This grading scale is based upon a purely abstract affirmance/
reversal rate. It bears no relationship to the work done by George
Priest and Benjamin Klein that found success rates in litigated
cases to be close to 50% regardless of whether the standard of
decision was strict liability or negligence."1 Yet the theory behind
(requiring a clearly erroneous test for review of Board of Veterans Appeals decisions);
discussion infra Part III.B. The clearly erroneous standard applies to judicial review of district
court factual decisions as well. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001).
26. To verify this order through established case law, consult DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
10, § 11.4.
27. Congress rarely articulates the reasons behind its choice of these standards, but that
does not mean it is unaware of their meaning. Occasionally members of Congress show
remarkable awareness of even subtle differences in oversight standards. See infra note 142
and accompanying text (discussing the statement of Senator Cranston concerning the choice
of the clearly erroneous standard for veterans' disability review).
28. In this way, de novo review of facts is similar to the standard applied to agency
decisions about law, at least as that concept was developed pre-Chevron. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
29. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying the Rulemaking Process,
41 DuxE L.J. 1385, 1453 (1992) (suggesting that judges reviewing complicated scientific
judgments utilize a pass/fail standard to grade the agency). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 95 (1995) (doubting
whether a pass/fail standard would be enforced or followed by reviewing judges).
30. The curve stipulated for use in this context approximates the (generous) grading
curves at many law schools today. If one wanted to respect original intent, the grading curve
in use in law schools when the APA was passed would produce much lower grades.
31. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
688 [Vol. 44:679
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this work, that substantive standards will not independently vary
outcomes because parties will have taken the applicable standard
into account in deciding whether to settle or litigate, cannot be
ignored. 2 The inevitability of the 50% outcome has to be considered
in terms of scope of review as well.
The Priest and Klein data have limitations which could affect the
50% affirmance rate for the types of cases explored here. For one
thing, gains and losses must be equal between the parties for the
50% affirmance rate to hold, which is often not the case in litigation
involving the government.' In addition, a necessary condition for
the Priest and Klein case selection hypothesis is the availability of
settlement in lieu of litigation.34 In the examples discussed here
settlement is often not an option, at least not in any formal way.35
For these reasons, it is possible to contemplate affirmance or
reversal rates which depart from the 50% win/loss proposition.
Hence the following chart:
Chart 1. Hypothesized Affirmance Rates
Under Various Standards of Review
Standard of Review" Hvothesized Affirmance Rates
No Review 100%




LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
32. Id. at 4-5 & n.17.
33. For example, in recent decades, the government's success ratio in antitrust cases,
whether brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
is 75%. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365,
381 (1970).
34. See Priest & Klein, supra note 31, at 12.
35. See infra note 103 concerning informal settlement options in Social Security
Administration (SSA) disability and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases.
36. "No review" can result from specific legislation, e.g., veterans' disability claims are
committed to agency discretion by law. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2000). "Clearly erroneous" is
distinguished from "substantial evidence" in theory although the two standards are often
equated in practice. See infra notes 43, 54.
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Naturally, speculating on grades and setting a curve are two
different exercises. Because the courts administer Congress' curve,
they are free to give the grades they want. Like professors,
reviewing judges sometimes think they know an "A" or an "F" when
they see one, and grade accordingly. In the academic world, this
tendency to subjectify the grading process can be reined in by
the use of mandatory curves. 7 Such a technique is obviously not
available to Congress or the courts, although some agencies
with large and repetitive caseloads, such as the Social Security
Administration (SSA), have on occasion experimented with the
concept.
38
But Congress is not helpless-it can still emphasize differences
among the standards. 9 It does this by implanting the suggestion
that narrow review cuts in the direction of limited reversal rates
and wide review cuts the other way. At this level of generality, the
Supreme Court could agree that Congress has enacted an oversight
spectrum, and, in the Universal Camera argot, "expressed a mood"' °
in which reversals of agency action should move in a more consist-
ent direction.
37. Law schools impose grading curves on faculty in order to ensure some measure of
grading equality in multi-sectioned courses. For example, Cardozo Law School's curve
requires a 3.2 average grade in classes with more than twenty-five students. This equals a
median grade slightly higher than a SB." By opting for grading equality in large sections, law
schools favor consistency above accuracy, what can be called the Ted Williams hypothesis. See
Anderson, supra note 9.
38. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. To draw conclusions about the impact
of scope of review standards requires a large volume of administrative decisions. Volume and
repetitive fact patterns are necessary in order to develop confidence levels about the accuracy
of any given curve. Even then, a reviewing court can apply a curve only when it has a
significant number of cases to consider at any time. To do this, a court would have to hold
decisions until it had a critical mass on which to rule, an impractical situation. Since all
decision making is time sensitive, even high volume decision contexts often lack sufficient
numbers at any one time to establish precise curves. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL
SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALs 139 (1978) (discussing this problem in the context of SSA
disability cases).
39. Congress usually does not spend much time on scope of review matters, preferring to
leave them to the default review provisions of the APA. On occasion, however, Congress has
become energized about scope of review. The Bumpers Amendment, S. 1080, 97th Cong. § 5
(1981), was one such occasion. The purpose of this amendment to the APA was to encourage
courts to give less deference to agency views on questions of law, but not on questions of fact.
See Ronald M. Levin, Review of "JurisdictionalV Issues under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983
DUKE L.J. 355. The amendment failed to pass, of course, and shortly thereafter the Court
moved in the opposite direction with the Chevron doctrine. See discussion infra note 54.
40. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
690
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Using consistent standards in this way can serve larger interests
as well. In effect, they can help mediate the institutional relation-
ship between agencies and reviewing courts in the fact-finding
process, not unlike what the Chevron doctrine tries to do for those
institutions in the policy-making process. By telling courts to review
agency decisions on what amounts to a sliding scale, Congress can
be seen as making workload choices for the agencies. Agency
decisions that might pass muster under arbitrary and capricious
review could be upset under a de novo standard. Consistent
application of these standards of review could help guide agencies
to process decisions with more or less formality. Depending on how
the agency has structured its hearing process, reversals might then
be expected to vary based upon the level of procedural formality
chosen or by the level of explanation provided.41 These tradeoffs
rarely occur, however, because Congress and reviewing courts do not
give agencies sufficiently clear signals about how the standards
should operate in practice.
We are therefore left with a weak proposition. Review standards
should not be directly tied to outcomes, but they should not ignore
or contradict outcomes either. Scope of review standards that fail in
some broad way to reflect the verbally defined sliding scale created
by Congress would seem to frustrate Congress' purposes, waste
agency and court time, and fail to guide the public perception of
judicial review. Awareness of outcomes offers a potential feedback
loop that shows how the relationship between agencies and courts
is working, and it can help agencies and courts understand the
effectiveness of their decision processes in relation to the goals set
by Congress.
41. Most agency adjudications are not bound by the formal adjudication provisions of §§
554, 556, and 557 of the APA. Rather, they are informal adjudications that receive little
guidance from the APA and have their procedures set by agency regulations. See Paul R.
Verkuil, Reflections Upon the FederalAdminitrative Judiciary, 39 UCLAL. REv. 1341,1343-
44 (1992) (describing a "federal administrative judiciary" that presides over mostly informal
adjudications and exceeds the federal judiciary by a factor of three); see also Paul R. Verkuil,
A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976) (describing a
study of forty-two informal adjudications).
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D. Unpredictability of Reversal Rates
Even if we assume reviewing courts and agencies describe review
formulas in ways that invite a deference scale,' if not a grading
curve, that does not make them predictable. Reversal rates on a
statute-by-statute, or even agency-by-agency, basis are scattered
across a wide range. Although outcomes may sometimes converge
between close cousins like the substantial evidence and clearly
erroneous tests, 3 reversal rates remain unpredictable, or even
counterintuitive, between the extremes of the arbitrary and
capricious and de novo standards." As will be shown next, the
arbitrary and capricious standard can on occasion produce more
reversals than the de novo standard. In terms of the grading
analogy, this is like making students do "A" work in order to get a
"pass" in a pass/fail course.
The problem seems not to be with the words themselves, but
with the limited expectations for predictability they currently
engender. Thus, although it is tempting to ask Congress to enhance
predictability by inventing new phrases," such efforts might only
interject more words that require interpretation." Whatever else
can be said about them, the existing formulas have the virtue of
42. In cases from Universal Camera Corp. to Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), the
Court has been concerned with both the unifying force of the APA scope of review provisions
and the specific conclusion that the substantial evidence standard is a less stringent test than
clearly erroneous review. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of
Agency Actions, 44 DUK L.J. 1110, 1114-17 (1995) (praising, with few exceptions, the
consistency and the durability of the substantial evidence test).
43. The APA standards of arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence can converge
when the former is used to determine factual support in the record. See Ass'n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 745 F.2d 677,684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("We have
noted on several occasions that the distinction between the substantial evidence test and the
arbitrary or capricious test is 'largely semantic.") (citations omitted).
44. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
45. Professors Shapiro and Levy, for example, propose amendments to § 706 regarding the
arbitrary and capricious standard for agency rule and policymaking that they argue could
instruct the courts more explicitly. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 23, at 1072-79.
Alternatively, should Congress want closer review than arbitrary and capricious, it might
adopt the "searching and careful" review standard advocated in Overton Park. See supra note
10 and accompanying text.
46. See Pierce, supra note 42, at 1132 (questioning the desirability of creating new scope
of review standards along the Shapiro/Levy line because of "uncertainty over the meaning of
new words").
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familiarity.' The challenge is to match the existing words to a
desired level of oversight rather than to ask Congress to re-
conceptualize them and run the danger of further complicating the
interpretive process.
II. THE SUPREME COURT BELIEVES THESE WORDS MATTER
The Supreme Court is no stranger to the application of scope of
review standards. Although the cases do not speak directly in terms
of outcomes, they accept the congressional deference scale from
which such conclusions could be drawn. Indeed, because the Court
takes scope of review and burden of proof standards seriously, the
relationship between the standards employed and the outcomes
obtained begs to be analyzed.
In Justices Breyer and Scalia, the Court has two former adminis-
trative law professors who clearly enjoy debating the meaning and
role of the APA and its scope of review provisions."8 In Dickinson v.
Zurko,'9 Justice Scalia joined Justice Breyer's majority opinion
which determined that the APA's substantial evidence standard,
rather than the clearly erroneous standard, was the appropriate test
when reviewing decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office."0
This decision reversed a unanimous en banc decision of the Federal
Circuit."1 The question at issue was whether use of the clearly
47. Justice Jackson noted that the APA was meant to settle "long-continued and hard-
fought contentions, and enactn a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have
come to rest." Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950). That spirit should
animate § 706 as well.
48. Not since the days of Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson has the administrative
law profession been as well represented on the Supreme Court. In addition to teaching
administrative law, Justice Scalia was a former agency official and chairman of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, and Justice Breyer was a law professor who
also served as chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Both have written important
articles and books on the subject. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY (4th ed. 1998); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
49. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
50. Id. at 161. Zurko was argued on the respondent's side by another well-known
administrative law professor, Ernest Gellhorn. An amicus brief urging reversal was submitted
by yet another administrative law academic, John Duffy. Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual
Property Professors in Support of Petitioner, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999),
available at http:I/jurist.law.pitt.edu/amicusldickinson_v zurko.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2000).
51. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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erroneous standard amounted to an "additional requirement]
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law"52 under § 559 of
the APA. Application of this exception would allow the clearly
erroneous standard to survive the otherwise mandatory require-
ments of § 706."s The Court concluded, on the contrary, that the
"somewhat stricter" clearly erroneous standard should give way to
the unifying formula of the APA.54
By using the term "stricter," the Court must have assumed that
reviewing courts were to look more closely and critically at cases
subject to clearly erroneous review. Indeed, Justice Breyer
postulated a higher reversal rate under the clearly erroneous
standard when he stated: "The upshot in terms ofjudicial review is
some practical difference in outcome depending upon which
standard is used.""5 Justice Breyer, however, then pulled his
punches by suggesting that the choice between these scope of
review standards might not make a difference in outcome.56 This
observation must have bemused the Federal Circuit, which
presumably had wanted to preserve the clearly erroneous standard
precisely because it was tougher on outcomes.57 Ultimately, by
52. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000).
53. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 153-54.
54. Id. at 153, 165. Subsequently, the Federal Circuit chose the APA's substantial
evidence standard over the available alternative of the arbitrary and capricious standard on
the presumed ground that the former standard was more strict than the latter. See In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000). On remand in Zurko, the Federal Circuit
applied the substantial evidence standard in reversing the Patent and Trademark Office. See
In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
55. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162.
56. Id. at 163-64; see also Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 745
F.2d 677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a statutory "'substantial evidence' requirement
applicable" to the review before the court "demand[ed] a quantum of factual suppport no
different from that demanded by the substantial evidence provision of the APA, which is in
turn no different from that demanded by the arbitrary or capricious standard'); Robert L.
Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58
HARV. L. REV. 70, 81 (1944) (reaching the same conclusion based on pre-APA cases). The
Zurko Court may have made this observation to reassure the Federal Circuit that things need
not change under the new oversight regime. At the oral argument, a member of the Court
asked counsel for Respondent (Professor Gellhorn) whether he knew of other cases in which
the standard of review would produce different outcomes. He replied in the negative. See Oral
Argument Before the Supreme Court (Mar. 24, 1999), in Transcript of Oral Argument, U.S.
TRANS. LEXIS, at *24-*25, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 160 (1999) [hereinafter Gellhorn
Argument].
57. The Federal Circuit's lengthy historical analysis contrasting the clearly erroneous
standard with the other APA alternatives is itself evidence that scope of review matters. See
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giving definitive support to the APA scope of review formulas, the
Supreme Court in Zurko endorsed the idea of a sliding scale of
reviewability with outcome consequences.
Of course, the Court is not of one mind regarding the meaning of
these review standards. Two years before Zurko, in Allentown Mack
Sales & Services, Inc. v. NLRB," Justices Scalia and Breyer wrote
warring opinions on how the substantial evidence standard should
be applied to a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion utilized the APA substantial
evidence standard aggressively to challenge the NLRB decision to
deny union representation. 9 Justice Breyer, in dissent, believed
that this approach would "weaken the system for judicial review of
administrative action that [the] Court's precedents ha[d] carefully
constructed over several decades.' ° "Weaken" in this context means
to weaken deference, not to weaken judicial review; and that word
nods in the direction of outcome analysis.
Even with their differences, Zurko and Allentown Mack demon-
strate that the Court takes review standards seriously. Although
neither case resorts to anything like a grading approach to
deference, they both imply that scope of review can be outcome
determinative. The cases also reflect the centrality of the judicial
role in these matters. In Zurko, the Court rejected a formula
Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452-58. In the original Zurko opinion, the Federal Circuit observed: "Our
ability to oversee complex legal determinations such as obviousness would be undermined if
the board's underlying factual determinations were reviewed more deferentially than for clear
error." Id. at 1459. There was little direct discussion of outcome effects except for one example
where it did not matter. See id. at 1453-54, 1459. In fact, in a review of the reversal rates of
the eighty-nine pre-APA clearly erroneous United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (the precursor to the Federal Circuit) patent cases cited in Justice Breyer's Zurko
Appendix, only ten of those cases were reversed in whole or in part. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 165-70.
This yields a reversal rate of about 11%, which tracks more closely to the hypothesized
arbitrary and capricious rate than it does to the clearly erroneous rate. This reversal rate is
set against the 75% grant rate. Oral argument in Zurko revealed that in 1998 the Patent and
Trademark Office received 200,000 patent applications and granted 152,000, approximately
a 75% grant rate. See Gellhorn Argument, supra note 56, at *44-*45.
58. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
59. Id. at 364-66.
60. Id. at 397 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Zurko, Justice
Breyer had seen no practical difference in scope of review standards because the Patent and
Trademark Office has sufficient expertise to make the decision under either standard. Zurko,
527 U.S. at 163. In Allentown Mack, however, the granting of deference to the NLRB, based
on the substantial evidence standard, was the issue that divided the Court. Allentown Mack,
522 U.S. at 388-89 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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established by a unanimous court of appeals and, inAllentown Mack
the Court rejected a long-preferred NLRB approach to scope of
review. Nonetheless, "if arbitrary and capricious" can mean the
same thing as "clearly erroneous" in Zurko, and if "substantial
evidence" can behave like "de novo" in Allentown Mack, we seem to
have a Court willing both to honor and at the same time to
deconstruct legislative words.
A. Contrasting the Outcome Effect of Standards of Proof
Although the Court may not calibrate outcomes when it applies
scope of review standards, it is more outcome oriented in dealing
with burdens or standards of proof. In this context, the Court makes
choices based on what it perceives to be the likely reversal rates
of relevant formulas. The potential for outcomes to vary can be
sufficient reason to invoke the Due Process Clause.
In Santosky v. Kramer," the Court held unconstitutional a state
law permitting termination of parental rights by administrative
officials pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence standard.62
The Court found that due process could only be satisfied by a clear
and convincing evidence standard." The Santosky Court was not
engaged in simple statutory interpretation as was the Zurko Court.
By rejecting legislative choice, the Court had to believe that the
standard chosen made a difference in outcome; if it did not, the case
should have been affirmed under the harmless error doctrine. In
opting for the clear and convincing standard (as opposed to the
preponderance of the evidence standard), the Court calculated that
more cases would uphold parental rights, or, alternatively, that the
state, as representative of the children, would lose more cases. In
this way, the Court's choice of standards of proof is an outcome
determinative exercise.6'
61. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
62. Id. at 747-48.
63. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that thirty-five states used the higher
standard of proof. Id. at 749-50; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282
(1990) (finding the clear and convincing standard in proceedings to terminate an incompetent
patient's life support to meet due process concerns).
64. Unlike the Court's ambivalence towards outcomes in Zurko, there was no suggestion
that the application of the clear and convincing test instead of the preponderance standard
might not make a difference in outcome. Instead, in comparing the two standards, the Court
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But here is the irony: Even when the Court intends to shift
outcomes, it cannot ensure such results. On remand in Santosky,
the New York state court simply upheld under the stricter standard
the earlier family court decision terminating parental rights.65 In
sum, the Court's choice of differing standards of proof encourages,
but does not guarantee, a different set of outcomes. The dissenters
in Santosky did not disagree with this outcomes approach. They also
phrased the inquiry in outcome terms, i.e., determining who should
bear the risk of error as between the state and the individual.'
This test, first articulated by Justice Harlan in In re Winship,67 a
case determining the burden of proof to be used in criminal
proceedings involving juveniles, assumes that close cases should be
decided in favor of the individual rather than the government.' The
risk of error test usefully refines the Santosky majority's concern as
expressed in Justice Blackmun's opinion, even though the degree to
which outcomes may change surely varies from context to context.69
This still leaves a working hypothesis with limited predictive
powers. If the burden is tilted to the government in the marginal
case, we can assume individuals will record more wins than losses
focused on outcome effects in the marginal case. Justice Blackmun observed: "A standard of
proof that by its very terms demands consideration of the quantity, rather than the quality,
of the evidence may misdirect the factfinder in the marginal case." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764.
65. In re John "AA," 453 N.Y.S.2d 942,946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
66. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Under the preponderance of
the evidence standard, the risk of error is allocated evenly, and under the clear and convincing
standard, it is allocated in favor of the parents. The dissent queried whether this tilt to the
parents was fair to the children, a proposition the majority had considered and rejected. Id.
at 788-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that for juveniles as well as adults,
convicting the innocent is more damaging than freeing the guilty, and agreeing that beyond
a reasonable doubt is the correct standard to apply in juvenile cases). Justice Brennan's
opinion for the majority recognized that the outcome would have been different because the
juvenile would have had to have been acquitted pursuant to the higher standard. Id. at 367-
68.
69. The only way to know what effect shifting the result in the marginal case produces is
to know how many cases cluster around the middle. That would require a study of the
determinative factors in decisions. Such data is not easy to obtain when dealing with a
disparate set of administrative decoders in custody cases employed by judges whose views
must vary greatly. A study of the impact of personal differences was undertaken in connection
with SSA disability decisions in which ALJ decisions were subject to a multifactor analysis.
This study allowed researchers to utilize surveys of ALJs to determine statistically the degree
to which ALJs' views about the substance of the disability programs affected their decisions.
See MASHAW, supra note 38, at 19-27.
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over time. This assumption drives the Court's intervention. In
holding that juveniles are entitled to a reasonable doubt standard
as opposed to the preponderance standard, the Court intended
to achieve results. As Justice Harlan emphasized in his Winship
concurrence, the choice of a standard of proof reflects "a very fun-
damental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous
factual determinations."70 The assessment of social costs is another
way of characterizing outcomes analysis.
B. Standards of Proof and Scope of Review Compared
Standards of proof differ from scope of review standards in two
relevant ways. First, standards of proof are applied by a lower court
or agency rather than by the reviewing court. Second, standards of
proof are subject to constitutional review, which is rarely the case
for scope of review standards.7 Nonetheless, when Congress has
spoken either on scope of review or on standards of proof, the Court
tries to honor Congress' wishes. For example, in Steadman v. SEC,72
the Court held that the SEC's use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard in disciplinary proceedings, rather than the
clear and convincing standard sought by petitioners, was compelled
by § 556(d) of the APA. 3 That provision requires the support of
substantial evidence in fact finding. The Court distinguished two
uses of the substantial evidence standard-one for the agency under
§ 556(d) and one for the reviewing courts under § 706(2)(E)--and
concluded that preponderance of the evidence and substantial
evidence were equal standards.74 When Congress is silent, the Court
will "choose" the standard that best fits its notions of fair
procedure.7" In Woodby v. INS,76 the Court held that Congress had
failed to establish a standard of proof for deportation cases and
70. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. See supra note 3.
72. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
73. Id. at 102.
74. The Court cited Vermont Yankee in emphasizing that it was bound by Congress' choice
of procedures. Id. at 104 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)).
75. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 95 (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966)).
76. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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rejected the civil preponderance standard in favor of the more
rigorous "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" standard.77
Nevertheless, as Steadman reminds us, standards of proof and
scope of review standards are different, and the use of a given
standard at the agency level does not necessarily require its use on
appeal.7" Indeed, a reverse correlation may apply. A higher stan-
dard of proof applied by an agency might be reviewed on a more
deferential scope of review standard precisely because the Court and
Congress are entitled to assume that a more thorough job was done
by the agency. Conversely, if the agency employs a lower standard
of proof, the reviewing court might utilize a more intense standard
of review, assuming Congress permits such a choice.
The Winship Court's cost-of-error formulation for standards of
proof provides a useful way to view the impact of outcomes on
agency review situations more broadly. In choosing the de novo
standard rather than the arbitrary and capricious test, for example,
Congress can be seen as placing the risk of error more upon the
government than the individual. This more intense level of review
means that individuals are more likely to be protected and agency
actions are more likely to be reversed. As the Zurko Court indicated,
the APA scope of review standards were intended to establish
unifying formulas.79 These formulas become, in essence, congres-
sional methods for allocating the risk of error. Once allocated, the
risk of error should affect reversal rates in the marginal case and
produce more outcome uniformity. By enacting the scope of review
provisions in the APA and in other statutes, Congress could be
viewed as endorsing the judicial assumptions emanating from
cases like Santosky and Winship.
The Court, however, occasionally ignores the unifying role of the
APA. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe'o is the classic
example. The Court energized arbitrary and capricious review in a
77. Id. at 277, 284-87; see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1980) (5-4
decision) (upholding Congress' preponderance of the evidence standard in denaturalization
cases); In Woodby, Justice Clark argued that Congress had in fact established substantial
evidence as the standard of proof based on the record as a whole, which equated with the
preponderance standard. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 287-91 (Clark, J., dissenting).
78. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 102.
79. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999); see also Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,489 (1951).
80. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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way that seemed to ignore congressional choices;8 and then the
Court seemed to be taken by surprise when lower courts promptly
complied.82 Sensing the unintended consequences of its interpre-
tation, the Court sought to rein in arbitrary and capricious review
in subsequent decisions, rejecting any implication in Overton
Park that trial de novo should serve as a backup to arbitrary and
capricious review under the APA.'s Although the Court did not rein
in "hard look" arbitrary and capricious review in other settings,8 4 it
minimized intense review of informal agency adjudications by
district courts in an effort to avoid the potentially higher reversal
rates such review surely would have produced.
In sum, when it comes to scope of review, the Court tries to
honor legislative expectations.85 By contrast, in standard of proof
81. See id. at 419-20 (rejecting the agency affidavits on which the lower court had based
its findings as "post hoc rationalizations" and remanding the case to the district court to
conduct a plenary review of the agency's decision).
82. Overton Park quickly became the leading case on scope of review over informal
adjudication and spread to review of rulemaking as well. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting
Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the
Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1992) (calling Overton Park the "foundation stone
for contemporary 'hard look' judicial review").
83. In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam), the Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard to subject the Comptroller of
the Currency's denial of a new bank application to district court trial review. Id. at 142. In
Pitts v. Camp, the lower court had resorted to de novo review because the Comptroller twice
failed to explain its decision properly. 463 F.2d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 1972). In the Fourth
Circuit's view, Overton Park compelled de novo review when the procedures employed were
inadequate to support the agency decision. Id.
84. Hard look review has retained vitality in connection with arbitrary and capricious
review of informal rulemaking. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But because of Camp v. Pitts, hard look review has not gained much
of a foothold in informal adjudication review. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87,101-06 (1983) (criticizing the "hard look' dimension of the arbitrary
and capricious standard implied in Overton Park); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 424 (1981)
(characterizing the Overton Park approach as 'intrusive substantive review"); see also Pierce,
supra note 23, at 308-13 (discussing the "powerful deterrents" courts have imposed on agency
rulemaking); Wald, supra note 23, at 625-29 (discussing the "hard look" doctrine in
rulemaking).
85. See Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) ("Congress was very
deliberate in adopting [the substantial evidence] standard of review. It frees the reviewing
courts of the time-consuming and difficult task of weighing the evidence, it gives proper
respect to the expertise of the administrative tribunal and it helps promote the uniform
application of the statute.") (footnotes omitted). Of course, when it comes to due process
review, state legislatures have traditionally been treated with less deference than Congress.
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situations, the Court questions legislative choice especially at the
state level and occasionally plays a trump card-the Due Process
Clause. In either situation outcomes are relevant to understanding
both the differences among the various review formulas and the
Court's guidance to lower courts.86
C. Scope of Review in Other Settings
To complete the picture it should be remembered that the Court
frequently monitors scope of review situations outside the ad-
ministrative context. Two disparate examples, sentencing review
and punitive damages review, serve to make the point. The Court
carefully monitors deference by the lower courts to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission.87 In Koon v. United States, 8 the Court held
that courts of appeals must review district court departures from
the Sentencing Guidelines under the abuse of discretion standard
rather than the de novo test.89 When it comes to questions of law,
the Court reasoned that little turned on those widely disparate
Compare Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,266 (1970) (mandating state welfare pretermination
procedures), with Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (concluding that due process
can be satisfied absent a hearing in federal disability cases).
86. Under the Chevron doctrine, the courts of appeals have bought into the Supreme
Court's approach. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1029-31 (analyzing
2,000 decisions by the courts of appeals that document a pre-Chevron affirmance rate of 71%
versus a post-Chevron rate of 81%). This 10% "affirmance premium" is an indicator of lower
court compliance with the instructions of the Supreme Court. It is far less clear whether
Chevron has had the effect of ensuring deterrence by the Supreme Court itself. See Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 481-86 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (indicating that the case
represented a rare rejection of an agency's interpretation of a statute in Chevron Step 2); INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (granting no deference
to an agency's interpretation of a statute which is inconsistent with the contested phrase's
plain meaning); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 998 (1992) (stating that the Court frequently ignores Chevron); Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,354 (1994)
(same).
87. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM., GUIDELm MANUAL (1991).
88. 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (reviewing the federal conviction of police officers in the Rodney
King case).
89. Id. at 96-100; see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)
(applying the abuse of discretion standard to Rule 11 sanctions).
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labels since "[a] district court by definition abuses its discretion
when it makes an error of law."90
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,91
however, the Court held that de novo review is appropriate when
reviewing the constitutional sufficiency of punitive damages
awards.92 The Court distinguished Koon as applying to legislatively
enacted guidelines and not issues of constitutional dimension.93
Significantly, the Court adopted an outcomes-based analysis in
determining the standard of review: "[Ilt does seem likely that in
this case a thorough, independent review of the District Court's
rejection of petitioner's due process objections to the punitive
damages award might well have led the Court of Appeals to reach
a different result.
Even though these situations often deal with review of legal
rather than factual questions, they testify to the Court's ongoing
interest in the relationship of standards to outcomes. In order to
carry the burden of this Article, however, we must now shift the
Court's interest in outcomes from review of questions of law and
policy to review over questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and
law. The next Part seeks to do just that.
III. SCOPE OF REVIEW IN CONTEXT: SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY,
VETERANS DISABILITY, AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
It is not hard to find individual scope of review situations to
support the reversal rate percentages postulated here; nor is it hard
to find examples that contradict them. However, it is hard to find
administrative adjudications in numbers sufficient to support
meaningful conclusions about the percentages involved. The number
of cases not only offers some level of statistical confidence, but also
facilitates assumptions about the issues raised. A large number of
90. Koon, 518 U.S. at 100.
91. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
92. Id. at 435-36; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-74 (1996)
(applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to excessive punitive
damages awards).
93. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432-33.
94. Id. at 441. Justice Ginsberg, in dissent, doubted the effectiveness of the new standard
and was also concerned about the diminishing effect on the Seventh Amendment of setting
aside a jury verdict on punitive damages. Id. at 444-47 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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repetitive fact situations by definition will yield cases that turn
more on scope of review over facts, pure or mixed.95
In the modern administrative state's two largest decision systems
-disability decisions by the SSA and Freedom of Information
(FOIA) requests certified by the Department of Justice (DOJ)-the
number of underlying claims filed annually is comparable. Each
agency faces about two million requests for either benefits or
documents annually. These agencies also have another roughly
comparable statistic-each grants approximately 50% of the claims
before it prior to judicial review." In addition to these agencies, the
third highest decision volume agency-the Veterans Administration
disability program-will also be evaluated.
Three scope of review situations are analyzed here: (1) district
court review of SSA disability cases under the substantial evidence
standard; (2) Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CVA) review of
Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) decisions under the clearly
erroneous standard; and (3) district court review of FOIA claims
decided under the de novo standard.' In the last Part, the
conclusions drawn from the examples will be tested against
comparable statistics drawn from appellate review of sentencing
decisions.9"
95. "Mixed" questions of law and fact are entitled to deference similar to "pure" fact
questions under the appropriate scope of review standards. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944). Another advantage of utilizing highly fact-based decisions
is that one can assume they will, in the aggregate, turn on factual components. It would be
extremely difficult and perhaps infeasible to collect case statistics in such a way as to
distinguish between decisions that turn on facts, rather than law.
96. See SOCIAL SECURrrY ADVISORY BOARD, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND
MATERIALS 20 (2001) [hereinafter SSAB, DISAmIT DECISION MAKING]; USDOJ, FOIA POST,
SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999, available at http'//
www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost2001foiapostl7.htm. (last visited Nov. 19, 2002). The 50% grant
estimate is also a reminder of the Priest and Klein selection hypothesis. See Priest & Klein,
supra note 31, at 1.
97. Of the four formulations described earlier, only arbitrary and capricious review is
excluded. Since, as to review of facts, that standard is equated with the substantial evidence
standard, see discussion supra note 43, its omission should not restrict the analysis.
98. See infra Part IV.
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A. Social Security Administration Disability Cases
The SSA disability process encompasses major federal programs"
that affect millions of Americans and expend close to $100 billion
annually.' The hearing process is prolonged and complicated.' '
After the initial and reconsideration stages, which are decided on
applicants' documentary submissions to state agencies, claimants
get a face-to-face hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ); and, after appeals council review, 102 a federal district court
may review the decision under the substantial evidence standard.
The hearing before the ALJ is conducted de novo, on a non-
adversarial basis."° SSA-ALJs decide more than 500,000 cases per
year, or an average of thirty-eight cases per AUL per month.' The
99. Disability is sought under either Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33
(2000), or under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (2000), depending upon
whether the claimant has worked the required number of quarters to qualify for Social
Security. Sometimes claims are filed under both titles. For purposes here, both statutes will
be referred to as "SSA disability" claims since the substantive standards of disability and the
scope of review standards are the same.
100. The disability program currently covers about 10 million individuals who received $90
billion in support, or 5% of all federal spending in the 2001 fiscal year. About $5 billion of
SSA's administrative budget is spent on disability work. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY
BOARD, CHARTING THE FUTRE OF SOCIAL SEcURITY's DISABILITY PROGRAMS: THE NEED FOR
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 1 (2001), available at http:/www.ssab.gov/disabilitywhitepap.pdf (last
modified Jan. 2001) [hereinafter SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE].
101. See SSAB, DISALTurY DECISION MAKING, supra note 96, at 4-5 (describing SSA's
disability applications and appeals process).
102. Appeals Council review must be sought by claimants as a condition for judicial review.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (2002). Review is discretionary with the Appeals Council, which
also may trigger review without request from a claimant. See Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David
A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social
Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 199, 243-49 (1990); see also
Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 103 (2000) (refusing to apply issue exhaustion to applications
before the Appeals Council).
103. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971). The adjudicatory system is
termed "informal" by the SSA, which "conduct[s] the administrative review process in an
informal, nonadversary manner." 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (2002). Although the Supreme Court
has noted that "Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial," Sims,
530 U.S. at 110-11, the presence of ALJs as presiding officers makes disability cases
functionally like formal proceedings even if not technically so under the APA. See Paul R.
Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 779,815-17 (1992). Disability cases are
not governed by §§ 554, 556, and 557 of the APA.
104. See SSA ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, tbl. 2.F9 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 SSA
STAT. SuPP.] (estimating 596,999 hearing decisions in 1999 and 584,546 in 2000).
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SSA employs about 1100 federal ALJs who preside over these
administrative hearings.' o6 To put this number in perspective, SSA-
ALJs are equal in number to the entire federal district and circuit
court judiciary.'0 6
AL disability hearings, conducted on a de novo basis, yield an
average reversal rate in excess of 50%."07 Because this is the first
chance the claimant has to tell her story face-to-face, such a statistic
seems to make sense. State officials can be expected to kick close
cases to the ALJs, and many cases fall into this category.'
l 8
Moreover, even though inter-judge reversal rates can vary greatly,10 9
the overall ALJ reversal rate falls within the range for de novo
reversals postulated earlier. What happens next, however, does not.
Even after high-side reversal rates at the agency level and a
further review by the Appeals Council,10 the reversal or remand
105. The SSA employed approximately 1180 ALJs in 1998; approximately 1107 in 1999;
and an estimated 1403 in 2000. Id. at tbl. 2.F8.
106. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning
of Article I, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 951-52 (2000) (listing 270 court of appeals and 850
district judges for a total of 1,120).
107. In the ten year period from 1991 through 2000, AIJ dispositions favorable to the
claimant averaged between 52.9% (1998) and 67.1% (1992). SSA OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND
APPEALS KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS (Fiscal 2000), at 2 [hereinafter KEY WORKLOAD
INDICATORS 2000]; see also MASHAW, supra note 38, at 21-24 (discussing the variance of
reversal rates of individual ALJs); Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 482-84 (linking the increase in
disability terminations to the SSA "caseload crisis" of the 1980s).
108. During the period between 1990 and 2000, state agency initial allowance rates moved
between 20 and 30%, and reconsideration rates were between 10 and 20%. SSAB, DISABILITY
DECISION MAKING, supra note 96, at 21. Given that the state officials are acting on
documentary records only (largely medical reports and vocation information), and that only
denials, but not grants, may be appealed, it makes institutional sense that all but
unequivocally clear cases be denied at this stage. See MASHAW, supra note 38, at 54-57.
109. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 85-88 (1983) (suggesting inter-ALJ disparities can be reduced or
eliminated by imposing a grading system); see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467
(1983) (approving an agency rule that was designed to limit variances among ALJs in the
application of vocational criteria). The larger problem of inserting an independent AU
decision system within a largely bureaucratic system is not addressed by these statistics. See
MASHAW, supra note 38, at 31-33. Nevertheless, because ALJs have established their
independence within that system, the SSA has accepted their performance at the 50% mean.
See Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1980) (reviewing the effect of the SSA's
"Quality Assurance Program" on the independence of ALJs).
110. In 1998, Appeals Council dispositions totaled 101,877 versus 618,578 total AJ
dispositions, or about 16%. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT 135 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 SSA STAT. SUPP.]. In 1999, the Appeals Council
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rates that occur on the district court's substantial evidence review
are unusually high. The rate at which district courts reverse and
remand disability determinations exceeds 50%."' Between 1994
and 1998, SSA civil litigations totaled between 8500 and 15,000
cases per year which constituted a significant portion of the
federal caseload.' If district court remands are partially equated
with reversals in terms of outcome effect,' in virtually every year
studied the nonaffirmance total meets or exceeds expectations under
the postulated de novo standard, let alone under the substantial
evidence standard.' Indeed, about the only standard the 50%
reversal rate seems to meet is Priest's case selection hypothesis."'
Why are SSA disability determinations so prone to rejection in
district courts even after ALJs have seemingly done their job under
the de novo standard? There are no easy answers. Such a result
appears to contradict the assumption that careful administrative
decision making, with an intense de novo review standard, should
percentage was about 13% and in 2000 it grew to about 23%. See 2000 SSA STAT. SUPP., supra
note 104, at 117. In 2000, the Appeals Council granted about 10% of the cases seeking
reversal of AJ denials of benefits and also remanded about 20%. See KEY WORKLOAD
INDICATORS 2000, supra note 107, at 43.
111. Since 1995, remands have become an increasing part of the district court decision
process. SSA now estimates that 40% of all judicial decisions result in remands and that
reversals have abated accordingly. Discussion with Rita Beier, Head of the Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals (July 2, 2001). In fiscal year 2000, 48% of the 12,001 district court
decisions resulted in remands. See SSAB, CHARTING THE FuTuRE, supra note 100, at 8. In
general, remands result in grants to claimants in the vast majority of cases. See, e.g., SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, at tbl. 2, F10 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
SSA STAT. SUPP.] (stating that in 1999, 83% of remanded cases resulted in agency reversals;
in 1993, the rate of reversal after remand was 94%).
112. See., e.g., 1995 SSA STAT. SUPP., supra note 111, at tbl. 2.F1O. Table 2.F10 of each
annual supplement contains this data, which excludes remands.
113. Remands are like reversals in that they produce a high percentage of decisions in
favor of claimants once they are returned to the SSA. More than 70% of judicial remands
result in disability grants by the SSA. See discussion supra note 111.
114. Professors Koch and Koplow report statistics on district court reversal rates of"20%
in 1982, 30% in 1983, 57% in 1984, 46% in 1985, and 38% in 1986." Koch & Koplow, supra
note 102, at 226. In the last few years, the combined reversal/remand rate has exceeded 50%.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. The selection hypothesis relies on
assumptions about rational choices by plaintiffs and defendants' that may not apply in the
SSA disability situation. But as the number of claimants represented by counsel increases,
and informed choices are made about which cases to select, that hypothesis may become more
potent. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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lead to more relaxed judicial oversight.'16 Moreover, the SSA has
been trying to improve the system for years, oftentimes with explicit
congressional assistance,"7 yet district judges, rather than deferring
under the substantial evidence test, still expend their valuable time,
or that of their magistrates, in close review of the facts supporting
individual cases.
These high rates of rejection, counterintuitive from an outcomes
analysis perspective, can only be explained by entering the realm
of inarticulate factors. SSA disability decisions suffer from an
entrenched judicial skepticism about their fairness and accuracy. To
some extent, this is a function of the difficulty of applying the legal
standard for determining disability." Taken literally, an applicant
who could perform any job in the national economy, even if that job
is unavailable, would have no entitlement to disability benefits.
Such a theoretical prospect is hard to accept,119 and district courts
intuitively may assist claimants by ameliorating the standard's
impact. 120 Even members of Congress who complain about the costs
of reversals often intervene with "status inquiries" to the agency on
behalf of their constituents who are applying for benefits,' a
116. See supra text accompanying note 41.
117. Congress is of two minds about the SSA disability system, wanting both to control the
costs of a multi-billion dollar program and also to care for individual claimants through
constituent services. See MASHAW, supra note 109, at 53-54; see also SSAB, CHARTING THE
FUTURE, supra note 100, at 1 (citing the need for "in-depth review" of disability programs).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 423(dXl)(A) (2000) defines disability in terms of the effect of physical and
mental impairment on the person's ability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity" in
the national economy. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1983) (establishing a
grid system for determining what jobs exist in the national economy). In determining
disability, the SSA must consider the claimant's "residual functional capacity," age, education,
and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (2002).
119. See Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REv. 833, 843-47
(1976).
120. See id. at 844-45.
121. See The Regulatory Morass at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services: A
Prescription for Bad Medicine; Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 107th
Cong. (2001) (prepared remarks of Brian Seeley, Board of Directors, Power Mobility Coalition;
President and CEO, Seeley Medical, Inc.) (complaining about the cost of appeals and the 80%
reversal rate in Medicare appeals); CoMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, OFFICE OF
ADVICE & EDUC., HIGHLIGHTS OF HOUSE ETHICS RULES (2001) (summarizing the rules for
members making status inquiries into agency and court cases), available at
http'Jwww.house.gov/ethics/Highlights200l.htm (last modified Jan. 2001). Although Congress
seeks to lower the costs of reversals, the House Ethics Rules allow members to request such
reversals of agency decisions. According to the Rules:
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practice that may also have a subtle effect on outcomes. People
without jobs and with poor medical records simply present
appealing situations which may make some district courts partners
in validation, rather than skeptical reviewers. In this setting, the
Winship proposition about assigning risks of error or identifying
social costs gets shifted to the government in practice, even though
the scope of review standard places it upon the claimant in theory.12 2
To some extent the SSA has been its own worst enemy. During
the 1980s, the SSA compromised the validity of its decision process
in two ways: (1) by commencing a policy of nonacquiescence in
federal court decisions;123 and (2) by insisting on fixed percentages
of affirmances and reversals through so-called Bellmon review.'-
These actions were the result of a variety of pressures. On the one
hand, the SSA desired to make its decision process more consistent
and predictable; at the same time, it was under pressure from
Congress and the White House to reduce the rolls of disability
recipients 25 The SSA's actions alienated virtually all sides and in
the process caused the courts to be skeptical about the accuracy
of individual agency decisions. 121 This led to dramatically higher
Members have broad discretion in helping constituents: may make a status
inquiry; urge prompt and fair consideration; ask for full and fair consideration
consistent with applicable law and regulations; arrange appointments-or,
where appropriate, express judgment, or ask for reconsideration of decision if it
is unsupported by law.
Id.
122. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
123. "Nonacquiescence" refers to the SSA's practice of limiting the precedential effect of
courts of appeals' decisions to the cases before them, or of selecting precedents it desires to
follow. See Carolyn A. Kubitschek, A Re-evaluation of Mathews v. Eldridge in Light of
Administrative Shortcomings and Social Security Nonacquiescence, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 53,53-54
(1989) (asserting that this policy undermines the due process calculus of Mathews).
124. The Bellmon Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304, 94 Stat. 441, 456 (1980),
established a performance review program in the Appeals Council that targeted ALJs with
high percentages of grants. See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 678-80 (2d Cir. 1989). For an
overview of the development of nonacquiescence, see generally MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY
UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 139-51
(1990).
125. See, e.g., Hoist v. Bowen, 637 F. Supp. 145, 147 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (referring to an
"anarchical situation" in which the SSA systematically ignored the Ninth Circuit); Ass'n of
Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the
Bellmon review program violated ALJ decisional independence).
126. See Levy, supra note 107, at 506; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 416
(1988) (stating that the SSA conceded benefits were erroneously terminated for approximately
200,000 recipients).
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reversal rates in the mid-1980s. 1 7 Once the SSA backed off on
Bellmon review, 1" SSA reversal rates began to decline. 129 None-
theless, with remands now on the rise, the current nonaffirmance
rate continues to exceed the percentage postulated for substantial
evidence review. 3 '
These and other factors'3 ' combine effectively to override the
congressionally chosen scope of review standard and raise questions
about whether the SSA disability system should be in the federal
courts at all, or at least in district courts on a substantial evidence
basis. 32 The recently created Court of Veterans Appeals' offers a
competing model for administrative review that may be looked to as
a source of procedural reform for the SSA disability system.1
34
127. See Koch & Koplow, supra note 102, at 226.
128. See Robert Pear, Reagan Suspends Benefits Cutoff, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1984, at Al;
see also Levy, supra note 107, at 506-07 (arguing that Bellmon programs made the federal
courts less deferential to the SSA).
129. The Bellmon review process took place during the 1980s and led to some high reversal
rate years. See Koch & Koplow, supra note 102, at 226 (referring to reversal rates of 46% in
1985 and 38% in 1986). Since then, reversal rates have been lower and more consistent on an
annual basis. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
130. Remands are usually based on some procedural failure with the ALJ or agency
decision and can have a disruptive effect on the SSA because the cases must be reassigned
and retried or disability grants paid (the predominate outcome). See MASHAW, supra note 38,
at 130.
131. Another difficult factor to measure is that, due to their high workloads, ALJs who hear
cases do not write their own opinions, which leads to judicial skepticism about the quality of
the underlying decision. See SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE, supra note 100, at 4. Moreover,
under the scope of review standard, the court may remand for "good cause." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2000). This provision may have the effect of encouraging remands by the district courts.
132. See Levy, supra note 107, at 528-32 (advocating "[ain Article I Court of Disability
Appeals with jurisdiction to review ALT disability determinations" on questions of law).
133. The Veterans Administration's (VA) system of review may have its own problems. See
James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process is Needed to
Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 223, 243-47 (2001) (arguing for combining
the VA disability appeals process into the existing SSA disability process).
134. The Judicial Conference of the United States has called for administrative review of
SSA disability claims, or, alternatively, for limited judicial review after the district court
phase. Recommendation 9a provides: "Legislation should be requested to improve the
adjudicative process for Social Security disability claims by establishing a new mechanism for
administrative review of ALJ decisions and limiting the scope of appellate review in the
Article III courts." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 33 (1995). The study also contemplates substantial evidence review in the
district courts only, with court of appeals review generally limited to questions of law. Id. at
46-47.
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B. Veterans Disability Claims
Veterans disability payments, like SSA disability payments, are
awarded to millions at the cost of billions.'35 There is no more
favored class of beneficiaries than veterans, yet, unlike Social
Security claimants, claims by veterans were judicially unreviewable
by statute until relatively recently." Under prior practice, three-
person Veterans Affairs (VA) rating boards made decisions that
were subject to final review by the agency. Now, judicial review of
Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) administrative decisions is
conducted by the Article I Court of Veterans Appeals (CVA). Review
is based on a clearly erroneous review of material facts.137 In
addition, the CVA must also apply a further (and unique) standard
of proof: by statute the veteran is entitled to the benefit of the
doubt."a
This latter provision, which codified VA practice going back to the
post-Civil War period, 39 complicates the application of a clearly
erroneous scope of review by the CVA. In effect, the reviewing court
is being asked to review decisions twice: first under the clearly
erroneous standard and then under the benefit of the doubt
standard. This led the CVA to adopt the view, guided by cases like
135. See U.S. DEP oFVETERANSAFFAIltSFACTSHEET, VADisability Compensation Claims
Processing, at 2 (May 2001), available at httpJ/www.va.gov/pressrel/claimpro.htm (stating
that 2.3 million veterans received benefits in 2001 and that the 2000 fiscal year cost of these
benefits was $14.7 billion); U.S. DEPr OF VErERANS AFFAis ANNuAL BENEFrr REPORT 80-99
(2001), available at httpJ/www.vba.va.gov/reports.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, VA Benefits Assist Millions of Americans (Sept. 12,2000), at http-J/vww.va.gov/OPA/
pressrel/PressArtInternet.cfm?id=213 ("[Alpproximately 2.3 million of the nation's 24.4
million veterans [are] directly compensated each month for injuries or illnesses .... The 70-
year projection shows that spending for disability compensation and survivors payments will
peak at $37.3 billion in 2032 .. ').
136. For a discussion of the congressional shift in 1988 from judicial unreviewability of
veterans claims to reviewability, see Bill Russo, Ten Years After the Battle for Veterans
Judicial Review: An Assessment, FED. LAW., June 1999, at 26; O'Reilly, supra note 133, at 223.
137. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(aX4) (2000). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is granted
the authority to review the CVA on legal errors only. The CVA has interpreted the clearly
erroneous test as ifit were being applied in a court review situation. See Gilbert v. Derwinski,
1 Vet. App. 49, 51-52 (amended 1991).
138. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2000) provides: "When there is an approximate balance of positive
and negative evidence regarding any issue material to determination of a matter, the
Secretary (of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." Id.
139. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2001) (codifying "reasonable doubt" policy); Gilbert, 1 Vet. App.
at 55.
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Winship and Santosky,'o that benefit of the doubt only comes in
when the evidence is at "equipoise.""' In practice, however, the
presence of the "tie breaker" probably intensifies the oversight role
of clearly erroneous review in every case.
142
Still, even when the benefit of doubt standard is applied
simultaneously with the clearly erroneous test, this "double test"
produces a BVA reversal/remand rate that approximates the hy-
pothesized rate for clearly erroneous reversals." Of course, the
BVA's reversal rate varies over time,'" but at no time does it meet
or exceed the reversal/remand rate by district courts over SSA cases.
Although the VA review situation is closer to predictable limits,
some critics of the VA claims system are unimpressed with the
quality of BVA review by the CVA. As a result, two dramatically
opposed suggestions have emerged: (1) that the VA system be folded
into the SSA system and district judges do both jobs;" or (2) that
the VA Article I disability court concept be expanded to encompass
140. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. In Gilbert, the CVA applied Winship
and Santosky when it interpreted the benefit of the doubt test. Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 53-54.
141. Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54. The CVA accepted the VA's use of a baseball analogy to
describe the benefit of the doubt standard, i.e., the "tie goes to the runner." Id. at 55-56.
142. The clearly erroneous test itself was carefully chosen by Congress when it created the
Veterans Judicial Review Act. One of its sponsors, Senator Cranston, stated that he was
confident that utilization of the "clearly erroneous" standard ... will permit that
court to carry out a more complete analysis of factual matters than would be
appropriate under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard ... It is also possible
... that the "clearly erroneous" standard could result in more fact review than if
the "substantial evidence" standard ... were adopted here.
134 CONG. REc. 31,472 (1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston). This remarkably nuanced
statement reflects a sophisticated congressional recognition of the differences among the three
scope of review standards discussed here and lends support to the outcomes analysis
approach.
143. See Claims Processing Testimony Before the House Comm. on Veterans Affairs,
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Rick Surratt,
Dep. Nat'l Legis. Dir., Disabled Am. Veterans) [hereinafter Surratt, Claims Processing
Testimony] (stating that the BVA reversed about 18% of cases between 1992 and 1999 and
that before the 1988 legislative changes, remands and reversals totaled 12% of cases); Russo,
supra note 136, at 28 (calculating a 12-14% BVA reversal prior to judicial review and a 15-
20% rate after).
144. Surratt, Claims Processing Testimony, supra note 143, at 2-3, 8; DEP't OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REP. # 5D2-B01-013, at 5-6 (1995), available
at http/Avww.va.gv/oigl62/reports/1995/5D2-BOI-013%20--%20appeals.htm (citing a remand
rate of 18 to 23% before the Court of Veterans Appeals was formed and a 50% remand rate
after); Russo, supra note 136, at 28 (placing the remand rate at "over 40%.").
145. O'Reilly, supra note 133, at 243-47.
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both VA and SSA claims.' These alternatives remain at the heart
of reform issues in disability review." 7
C. Freedom of Information Act Cases
FOIA provides for de novo review in district courts of agency
actions denying access to documents in the possession of
government.'" Unlike district court review of SSA disability cases,
the APA preferred standards of "arbitrary and capricious" and
"substantial evidence" have been explicitly preempted in FOIA cases
by the de novo standard. 9 In FOIA cases, the issue before the
district court is usually whether the requested documents meet the
specific exemptions claimed by the non-producing agency. Unlike
the SSA and VA disability situations, the requester in FOIA cases
has not had a hearing before the agency, since a hearing would
require either production of the very documents the government is
suppressing or an administrative in camera review proceeding.
What the district court sees are conflicting affidavits rather than
a transcript of a hearing below, and these cases are often decided
by cross motions for summary judgment."o Although summary
judgment is by definition concerned with issues that are legal and
not factual in nature, the standard of review does not change
because de novo applies in both situations.'
146. Levy, supra note 107, at 528-32.
147. See infra note 228.
148. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4XB) (2000).
149. The de novo review standard made explicit in FOIA is different from the de novo
standard defined under APA § 706(2XF). That standard only comes into play in the rare
circumstances where there is no record below. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42
(1973) (per curiam); supra note 83 and accompanying text. In FOIA cases, although there is
no administrative hearing in the traditional sense, there is still a record below which gets
certified to the court by the DOJ. Hence, the FOIA de novo standard allows the district court
to review on the existing record.
150. It is estimated that summary judgment occurs in about 90% of FOIA appeals.
Discussion with David Vladeck, Public Citizen Litigation Group (July 11, 2001).
151. FOIA review involves the application of scope of review to facts and/or to application
of facts to law. Pure questions of law and policy are not implicated and Chevron deference
does not apply. Since FOIA is an APA statute, it is not organic agency legislation which would
normally be eligible for Chevron deference in any event. See Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792
F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Scalia, J.), affd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987). The question
of Chevron deference is closer in Exemption 3 cases, in which the presence of other statutes
can trigger the FOIA exemption. See, e.g., Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132,
1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that I.R.C. § 6103 triggers FOIA's Exemption 3 for tax
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The de novo standard is the most aggressive judicial review
standard available. As hypothesized here, it should yield a higher
reversal rate than the more deferential substantial evidence and
clearly erroneous standards. Conceptually, even a 50% de novo
reversal rate, much like that which occurs before ALJs in SSA
disability cases, would not be surprising. But this is clearly not the
situation. Over the thirty-five year life of FOIA, it has been
estimated that the district court reversal rate is closer to 10% than
50%. In order to confirm the 10% reversal rate estimate, this Article
surveyed all FOIA cases decided over the past decade. This study
revealed that, of the more than 3600 FOIA cases were decided in the
district courts during the ten year period from 1990 to 1999, just
over 10% were reversed. 1
52
In maintaining this modest reversal rate over such a long time
and for so many cases, one has to ask whether the courts have
ignored the de novo standard. District courts seem to affirm FOIA
cases almost instinctively, and by so doing have produced a real
world reversal rate that is closer to the hypothesized arbitrary and
capricious standard. In effect, the de novo standard in FOIA cases
has become the mirror image of the substantial evidence standard
in SSA disability cases. If they were switched, the reversal rates
might meet outcome expectations. But as they stand, neither
standard appears to fulfill the expectations Congress set for them.
return information); A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 143-46 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that FTC Act § 21(f) triggers FOIA Exemption 3 for information "provided voluntarily
in lieu of compulsory process" by parties under investigation); McGilvrav. NTSB, 840 F. Supp.
100, 101-02 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that 49 U.S.C. § 1905 triggers FOIA Exemption 3 such
that the NTSB can not release an unedited version of a cockpit voice recorder tape); see also
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (limiting Chevron deference over an
informal agency policy statement and invoking Skidmore deference instead).
152. See Appendix A. Each FOIA case is given a number in an annual report published by
the Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy. See, e.g., DOJ FERnDOM OF
IFORMATION CASE LIST (2000). Cases were examined as follows: all dispositions that were
affirmed, plus voluntary dismissals amounted to 2961 cases. To this 2961 total was added 50%
of the 208 partially affirmed and reversed cases on the grounds that they could be called
either way; all stipulated dismissals where no attorneys' fees were awarded (546) were also
added in. This totaled 3611 cases. Subtracting the cases reversed (189) plus one-half of the
cases affirmed/reversed in part (104) produced 293 cases, which when divided by 3611,
creating a reversal rate of 8.1%. If the 139 stipulated dismissals are considered to be "cases
reversed" when attorneys' fees were awarded (on the assumption that there was merit to the
claim), the reversal rate rises to about 11.7%. Thus, for the decade, the reversal rate can be
set between 8 and 12%. This suggests that the 10% overall reversal rate for the 36-year life
of the program is a reasonable approximation.
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Because Congress clearly gave the courts a broad mandate
to oversee FOIA cases, i" one wonders why the invitation has
been declined. Again, inarticulate factors seem to offer the only
explanations. But first the judicial response must be analyzed to see
if it varies depending upon which exemptions are at issue. Although
the eight FOIA exemptions are all formally subject to the de novo
review standard, some exemptions may engender stricter review
than others. That possibility was tested in order to see if it produced
a potentially distorting effect on reversal rates.4
1. The Special Case of Exemption 1
The prime candidate for special treatment is FOIA's Exemption
1, which exempts from disclosure national security information
"properly classified pursuant to an Executive order.""s District
courts might be expected to err on the side of nondisclosure of
national security information, even when the classifications are
questionable. Thus, despite an explicit congressional invitation
to do so," the courts have rarely granted requests under this
exemption. As a result, even though the de novo standard applies,
the judicial instinct remains highly deferential."x5 Prior to 1986,
appellate courts had not upheld any decisions to reject an agency's
classification claim. 5 8 A separate analysis of Exemption 1 cases in
153. FOIA grants broad jurisdiction to U.S. district courts and provides for in camera
examination. 5 U.S.C. § 552(aX4XB) (2000). Under FOIA, the agency has the burden of
justifying nondisclosure, which it sustains by submitting detailed affidavits that index the
documents requested and assert justifications for nonproduction for each document under the
claimed exemptions. Affidavits, not denial letters, must be used. See DOJ, FOIA GUIDE AND
PRIVACY ACT OvERviEw 592-93 (2000).
154. See DOJ v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. 5 U.S.C. § 552(bXl); see Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995) (prescribing "a
uniform system classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information").
156. In 1974, Congress responded to the case of EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), in which
the Supreme Court held secrets properly classified pursuant to this exemption per se exempt
from disclosure, by providing expressly for de novo review and in camera review of documents.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(aX4XB).
157. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(noting the benefits of district courts' "wide discretion" in reviewing FOIA requests).
158. See DOJ, FOIA GUIDE & PRIVACY OvERvIEw 83-86 (2000).
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the 1990s 59 confirms that situation (and in our post-9/11 world we
can expect that not to change).
In practice, the de facto standard of review is not "de novo" or
even "arbitrary and capricious" in Exemption 1 cases; it is closer to
"committed to agency discretion."' This review reality is rarely
acknowledged; but occasionally a court will admit that Exemption
1 cases are different. 61 The courts seem to have effectively amended
the FOIA de novo standard without Congress' concurrence.
But the Exemption 1 phenomenon still does not explain the
overall FOIA outcomes divergence. Recalculating FOIA cases
without Exemption 1 cases only increases reversals by about 1%
to around 11%.12 Although this reversal rate moves closer to a
hypothesized arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence
reversal rate, it does not approach a "true" de novo rate."
2. Judicial Views About Freedom of Information Act
The Supreme Court was initially supportive of FOIA's
purposes,' 6 but it has come to view the Act with skepticism, if not
resistance. 165 Today, FOIA faces an uphill fight. The Court's
approach to FOIA cases began to shift in the 1980s. In DOJ v.
159. Cases decided under Exemption 1 during the 1990s were individually reviewed. See
infra Appendix B. No ultimately successful challenges were revealed. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v.
DOJ, 57 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1995); Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 766 F.2d 604, 605
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing a district court's finding that requested information did not meet
Exemption 1).
160. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (2000).
161. In Stein v. DOJ, 662 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1981), the court referred to the congressional
history of the 1974 Amendments to Exemption I and concluded: "Congress did not intend that
the courts would make a true de novo review of classified documents, that is, a fresh
determination of the legitimacy of the classification status of each classified document," I.
at 1253 (emphasis added).
162. If Exemption 1 cases are excluded from the denominator, the adjusted reversal rate
is only increased by a percentage point or two. Recalculating 1990-1999 FOIA cases without
Exemption 1 cases produces a small increase in reversals to about 11%.
163. See Stein, 662 F.2d at 1253.
164. See, e.g., Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) ("[FOIA's] basic
purpose reflected 'a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.').
165. As of 1995, twenty-four of the twenty-nine Supreme Court cases ruling on the FOIA
have been negative from the requester's perspective. Since 1995, the Court has decided two
cases. See Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001); Bibles
v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n., 519 U.S. 355 (1997).
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Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,"6 the Court adopted a
more restrictive reading of FOIA in denying access to certain law
enforcement records under FOIA Exemption 7(c). 6 7 The Court
determined that FOIA's "central purpose is to ensure that the
Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public
scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens
to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed."'" This
judicial gloss'69 encouraged categorical decisions which narrowed
the Act's scope. 17°
The Court's skepticism about FOIA is also fed by factors such
as the unsympathetic nature of the typical FOIA plaintiff, who
need only be "any person,"' 17 and the runaway costs of agency
compliance.'72 Of course, we can now add another factor to the
calculus for determining whether courts should force agencies to
produce records: the impact of 9/11 and concerns about terrorism.
The Attorney General has issued a FOIA compliance standard that
raises these concerns and counsels against production where there
are any doubts. 173
166. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
167. Id. at 774-80.
168. Id. at 774.
169. Cf ALEXANDER MEnM&OHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948) (arguing that the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect political speech, not
private and commercial speech).
170. See Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1991) (rejecting disclosure of files of
Haitians denied asylum).
171. Unlike sympathetic Social Security disability claimants, FOIA plaintiffs are often
prisoners who appear pro se or business competitors seeking to take advantage of the Act for
selfish reasons. See Sean E. Andrussier, Note, The Freedom of Information Act in 1990: More
Freedom for the Government; Less Information for the Public, 1991 DUKE L.J. 753, 755-58
(discussing the public interest/personal privacy analysis courts undertake in FOIA cases).
172. See DOJ FOIA ANN. REP. (2000), available at httpIlwww.usdoj.gov/oip/annual-.reportl
2000/00foiapg9.htm (estimating that FOIA's total cost to the federal government was over $69
million for 2000); DOJ FOIA ANN. REP. (1999), available at http-//www.usdoj.gov/oip/
annualreport1999/99foiapg25.htm (estimating that FOIA's total cost to the federal
government was over $59 million for 1999); see also Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of
Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14 (discussing FOIA's
unintended consequences).
173. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of All Federal
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), at httpJAvww.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm
(emphasizing the national security and law enforcement interests often at stake in making
FOIA decisions).
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3. Comparison to Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Cases
A further indicator of attitudes towards FOIA can be gleaned
from the judicial reception of"reverse-FOIA" cases, which have been
permitted since 1979.' In these cases, private parties seek to
prevent agencies from voluntarily producing documents requested
under FOIA. These actions second guess the agency's failure to
assert exemptions that might have suppressed production. The
judicial review standard for challenging agency action in reverse
cases is not de novo, but instead follows the review standards of
§ 706 of the APA, which usually means arbitrary and capricious. 7
An outcomes analysis of reverse FOIA cases yields an intriguing
statistic: a reversal rate that hovers around 20%.176 This rate is
notable on two counts. First, it is about twice as high as the FOIA
de novo rate of 10%. Second, it is close to the range for arbitrary and
capricious cases hypothesized here.'"
Congress considered amending FOIA in 1986 to include coverage
of reverse cases. 7 ' In the course of that effort, the House debated
changing the scope of review standard over reverse-FOIA cases to
de novo,179 which was one of the reasons the bill failed."s Ironically,
this might have been an unnecessary exercise: based on the
statistics analyzed here, submitters are doing better under arbitrary
and capricious review than FOIA plaintiffs are doing under de novo
review.
174. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1979) (authorizing suits to stop
agencies from acquiescing in disclosure).
175. Because reverse-FOIA cases are not heard in an on-the-record agency proceeding
which would trigger substantial evidence review under § 706(2XE), the default provision
becomes arbitrary and capricious under § 706(2XA). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
176. Reverse-FOIA cases are far fewer in number than FOIA cases. For this Article all
reverse cases decided since 1979 were analyzed. Sixty-four reported cases were found. Of that
total, forty went to judgment. Thirty-two of those cases were decided in favor of the agency,
leaving eight (or 20%) favoring the private objector.
177. See supra Part I.C.
178. See Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1986, H.R. 4862, 99th Cong. (1986).
House Report 4862 would have given submitters advance notice of agency decisions to release
self-designated proprietary information. Id. § 2.
179. See 132 CONG. REC. 25,172 (1986) (statement of Rep. Weiss).
180. Congressman Weiss stated: "There is no reason that ... [the submitters] need de novo
review." Id. at 25,173. The point made here is that Congressman Weiss was right in more
ways than one.
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FOIA review remains a perplexing exercise." The de novo
standard of review, which everyone accepts as robust, is revealed as
anemic. Even reverse-FOIA cases under arbitrary and capricious
review do better in outcomes analysis than de novo FOIA review
cases. The black box of "inarticulate factors" seems once again to
trump outcomes analysis.
D. Summary
The three different scope of review provisions analyzed above are
attached to structurally distinct administrative systems. Social
Security disability involves district court substantial evidence
review of administrative decision making by ALJs. ' 2 This is the
classic "agency-court" review structure described in Zurko.'" In
Veterans Administration disability cases, the clearly erroneous
standard is applied by an Article I Court to informal determinations
of the BVA, creating an agency-agency review structure. In FOIA
cases, the de novo standard is applied by district courts to an
informal administrative structure that does not provide a hearing
at all. This also results in an agency-court review structure.
The following summary chart ties the actual reversal rates under
these three structures to the rates hypothesized earlier: 84
181. A possible explanation might come from the Priest and Klein selection hypothesis,
which acknowledges that its 50% win/lose rate does not hold where the defendant has a strong
interest in protecting against successful claims. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
The DOJ, as the defendant, can effect the reversal rate by not defending weak agency denials
and by pulling cases, or, as a last resort, producing the documents sought if the case appears
to be a loser before the district judge.
182. The SSA disability system is not formal in the technical sense that it deserves firm
application of §§ 554, 556, and 557 of the APA, but it is functionally formal in that an ALJ
presides over the hearing. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971) (noting that
the conduct of the hearings is generally informal); see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of
Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CH. L. REv. 739, 739 n.1 (1976) (defining "informal
adjudication"). The SSA disability program is one of the few examples of ALJs presiding over
hearings not controlled by formal APA procedures.
183. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150,152-68 (1999) (discussing at length agency-court and
court-court review situations).
184. See supra Chart 1, at note 36.
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Chart 2. Actual and Hypothesized Affirmance Rates
in SSA, VA, and FOIA Review
Hypothesized Actual
Proceeding Review Standard Affirmance Rate Affirmance Rate
SSA-ALJ Review De Novo 40-50% 50%
SSA-District Substantial 75-85% 50%
Court Review Evidence
VA-CVA Clearly Erroneous 70-80% 80-85%
FOIA-District De Novo 40-50% 90%
Court Review
Reverse-FOIA-District Arbitrary or 85-90% 80%
Court Review Capricious
This comparison reveals instances where the hypothesis mirrors
reality (SSA-ALJ decisions, CVA appeals, and Reverse-FOIA cases),
but also instances where it fails dramatically to do so. These are
district court decisions in SSA disability and FOIA cases.
To help explain these anomalies through certain inarticulate
factors, the mission, administrative hearing procedures, and scope
of review reversal rates might be viewed on a low (L), medium (M),
and high (H) scale." The result would look something like this:
Agency Mission Formality of Scope Provision Review
SSA M H M H
VA H M M M
FOIA L L H L
The VA disability structure seems the most predictable on this
scale, with SSA disability and FOIA decisions still falling outside
any notion of predictable outcomes. In sum, of these three examples,
185. This chart uses "agency mission" to define the protective nature of the statute towards
its beneficiaries. It refers to the scope of review scale hypothesized in this Article. See supra
Chart 1, at note 36.
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only one supports the hypothesis that outcomes actually define
standards of review. The next Part will broaden the analysis to
include review of sentencing decisions, in order to see whether
outcomes analysis might apply to another review standard.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SENTENCING DECISIONS
Review of sentencing decisions involves a court-court oversight
structure where courts of appeals apply the clearly erroneous
standard to district court sentencing decisions. This is court-court
review with a twist because it is based on a set of guidelines created
by an administrative agency, albeit an agency in the judicial, not
executive, branch.' Incorporating this structure into the analysis
allows us to compare scope of review outcomes in a pure Article III
setting, and to inquire whether structuring discretion in advance
might be employed at the agency level in order to align outcomes
with standards.
Oversight of sentencing decisions is a relatively new venture,
one which, like review of veterans disability decisions, is set against
a background of unreviewable discretion.' Indeed, this shift in
accountability is even more dramatic than in the VA review
situation because it involves review of Article III institutions
for whom independence is the cardinal virtue. Perhaps for this
reason many district judges view sentencing oversight as a
source of frustration and a diminishment of their role.'
The Sentencing Guidelines are a complicated structure and they
operate under a strict set of rules. The Sentencing Commission uses
a "heartland" concept to identify the typical or core case.' Inside
186. See U.S. SENTENCINGCoMM, AN OVERVIEW OFTHE U.S. SENTENCINGCOMMN (1999),
available at http'/Avww.ussc.gov/general/ovrvuweb.pdf; see also Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 368.70 (1989) (describing the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
187. Until the advent of federal sentencing guidelines, the doctrine of nonreviewability
applied to sentencing in the federal court system. See Dorszyinski v. United States, 418 U.S.
424, 431-32 (1974). This nonreviewability standard was articulated in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932) (stating that only Congress, not the judiciary, may alter a
statutory penalty); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence
Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997).
188. See, e.g., Michael Edmund O'Neill, Abraham's Legacy: An Empirical Assessment of
(Nearly) First-Time Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291, 339-41 (2001)
(discussing the results of a 1996 survey of district court judges).
189. The Guidelines Manual directs courts to view each guideline as establishing a
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that core, little sentencing discretion is permitted.' Outside the
core, district courts may depart from the guidelines, but even in
those limited circumstances, judicial review is still active.19 In
United States v. Koon,'92 the Supreme Court debated the proper
review standard to be applied to departures from the Guidelines.
The question was whether the de novo standard or the seemingly
less stringent abuse of discretion standard should be applied to
Guidelines departures reviewed by the courts of appeals.193 The
Court opted for the latter standard.' But even under this standard,
which equates to arbitrary and capricious review of agency action,
the reviewing courts have been alert to unjustified departures from
the Guidelines by the district courts.
The reversal rate of appealed cases 95 averages around 20%.'
This rate is consistent with the arbitrary and capricious reversal
rate hypothesized in this Article."9 This rate of reversals may
become constant over time or may simply reflect the transition to a
new regime by trial courts learning to adjust. In choosing the abuse
"heartland" of typical cases. Departures from the guidelines are meant to be limited to
atypical cases. The departures are themselves controlled by a list of permissible and
impermissible factors. U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, GuIDELINE. MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A.,
Introductory Cmt. 4(b) (2001) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
190. See id ch. 5, pt. A (displaying Sentencing Table).
191. At least one court of appeals has outlined a framework of questions to consider for
district courts that want to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Rivera,
994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.). The district court's decision to depart from the
guidelines is subject to further review by the court of appeals. Id. at 950-52 (describing the
review process).
192. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
193. Id at 91.
194. The Koon Court recognized that on questions of law, for example, whether a decision
was within the heartland, no deference was owed the district court. Id. at 99-100. The Court
then found that the district court abused its discretion by considering the defendant's
occupation of police officer to justify taking its decision out of the heartland criteria. Id. at
110.
195. Only a small percentage of Guidelines cases are appealed. In Koon, the Court noted:
"In 1994, for example, 93.9% of Guidelines cases were not appealed." Id. at 98.
196. U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, 1999 ANN. REP. 40 (1999) (reflecting 80% affirmance rate),
available at http'//www.ussc.gov/ ANNRPT/1999/ar99toc.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
197. The universe of appeals is small relative to the total number of cases. That fact
undoubtedly affects the reversal rates. It also suggests a large number of cases that fall
within the Guidelines are essentially unappealable. By comparison, of almost two million
initial SSA claims, in fiscal year 2000, only about 12% reached the Appeals Council (122,780)
and only 10% of that total (12,011) reached the federal courts. See SSAB, CHARTING THE
FUTURE, supra note 100 at 8, 21.
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of discretion standard over de novo review, the Koon Court
presumably meant to reinforce the primary role of the district courts
in the sentencing process and may have been signaling courts of
appeals that higher rates of affirmance should be expected in the
future. For purposes here, the crucial point is that the Court chose
to send signals to the courts of appeals through the selection of a
scope of review standard. Once again, the Court is using scope of
review to effect outcomes. Like its decisions on review standards
discussed earlier,'98 the Court expects that over time the lower
courts or agencies involved will move their outcomes or reversal
percentages in the desired direction.
The sentencing review experience offers an entirely new ap-
proach to review. It establishes a system where initial decisions are
made more predictable by a carefully calibrated and elaborate
matrix of relevant considerations. 199 This process has lessons for
administrative review. By subjecting district courts to oversight of
their most fundamental decisions, incarceration of criminals, the
Supreme Court has invited an inference: that administrative
decisions, those of lesser formality and social importance, could also
be susceptible to such control, whether by agencies, Congress, or the
courts themselves.
The purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines, to limit discretion by
individual judges and thereby enhance uniformity in sentencing, 20°
connects to a longstanding problem of administrative law: the use
of rulemaking to foreclose factual determinations in adjudication.
In the Social Security disability field, the Supreme Court in Heckler
v. Campbell2 ' gave its approval to rules that set medical-vocational
guidelines, even though these guidelines had the effect of denying
individual AU hearings on the issues at stake.0 2 The Heckler case
recognized the enormous potential that rulemaking has for re-
calibrating the relationship between the courts and agencies on
judicial review. The purpose of the "grid rule" at stake in Heckler
198. See supra Part II.
199. The relevant considerations include, but are not limited to, the nature of the offense,
the identity of the victim, the defendant's role in the crime, and his or her criminal history.
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 189, at §§ 2AX, 3A1.1-1.2, 3B1.1-1.4, ch. 4A.
200. See id. at ch. 1, pt. A.3.
201. 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
202. Id. at 468 ("To require the Secretary to relitigate the existence of jobs in the national
economy at each hearing would hinder needlessly an already overburdened agency.").
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was to guide agency deciders and to reduce the discretionary
component of individualized decision making.
2°3
Agencies, which sometimes struggle with congressional and
judicial skepticism over their use of generic rules,204 might learn
from the explicit support the Sentencing Commission gives to the
rulemaking experience. Structural limitations on sentencing
discretion affect fundamental rights by determining the length of
prison sentences. By contrast, agency rules created to reduce
discretionary decision making will have far less dramatic conse-
quences. Moreover, given their experience with the Sentencing
Guidelines, district courts-as the reviewers rather than the
reviewed in the SSA disability area-might usefully reflect on these
contrasting experiences. Reducing discretion through generic rules
in light of the sentencing guidelines as an endorsement of earlier
agency efforts to regularize disparate decisions by ALJs. °5
When it comes to district court review of FOIA decisions, the
sentencing experience appears to offer contrary lessons. FOIA
decisions are not made by an agency hearing process, let alone one
with elaborate rules and procedures regarding the exercise of
discretion.' ° Yet, under the far more stringent standard of de novo
review, FOIA decisions are routinely affirmed by district courts.2 7
The degree of oversight lavished by district courts on Social Security
disability cases is absent, as is the care given to reduce judicial
discretion in the sentencing context.
It is hard to overcome the impression that in one situation (FOIA)
the district courts have failed to grasp the nettle, whereas in the
203. See id. at 461-62.
204. The distinction between issues that are generic and susceptible to rulemaking and
those that are individual and subject to adjudication is an elusive one. This classic dichotomy
determines the application of the Due Process Clause. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3.2, at 249-51 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the individual-
group distinction made famous by the Londoner and BiMettalic cases); see also Anaconda Co.
v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying the distinction to an EPA
rule limiting emissions at one plant).
205. Recently, the SSA has not actively engaged in rulemaking to reduce ALJ discretion
in disability adjudications. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. The SSA could consider
revisiting rulemaking to establish decision parameters by exercising the authority derived
from Heckler v. Campbell. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
206. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(6) (2000) (describing how an agency must respond to a FOIA
request).
207. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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other (SSA disability) they have been reluctant to ungrasp it. The
sentencing review experience offers district courts better insights
into their reviewing function. This new awareness could be an
opportunity to open a dialogue on the scope of review problem with
the district courts. The FOIA situation is different. It does not have
a specific agency to press its case, nor a court system to favor its
potential beneficiaries. All it has is a favorable review standard
which is not enough to predict or control decision outcomes.
V. LESSONS IN SCOPE OF REVIEW FOR THE SUPREME COURT AND
CONGRESS
It is asking a lot to have scope of review standards reflect
outcomes or reversal rates in a predictable way. Review standards
have to be measured after the fact, and they are entangled with the
inarticulate premises of judicial oversight. Cases have individual
characteristics and an unknowable mix of law and facts, such that
outcomes are hard to determine in advance. As with umpires,
questions ofjudgment are complicated and calls are rarely obvious.
Despite these difficulties, inquiring about outcomes can be a
revealing exercise. The analysis can discern trends and highlight
counterintuitive outcomes. Ultimately, the efficacy of a review
system is judged by the results it produces. In a broad sense,
affirmance, remand, and reversal rates are the results produced.
The SSA, VA, and FOIA programs offer opportunities for closer
study and action. The question now is: What lessons can be drawn
from these divergent scope of review experiences?" s
A. Reassessing Social Security Administration Disability Review
If substantial evidence review of SSA disability cases seems to be
more intense than the scope of review provision demands, or even
permits, that speaks not so much to subject matter (e.g., whether
208. The VA system will not be discussed separately. It is a more recent review structure
that, despite criticisms, appears to be implementing the goals Congress set for it. Moreover,
it passes the outcomes analysis "test" (20% for clearly erroneous review), so in some rough
sense it is in compliance'with the goals set here. The VA system remains important, however,
if Congress asks whether review of SSA disability cases should be restructured under an
Article I system or, conceivably, whether VA disability should be governed by district court
review. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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the claimants are sympathetic2°9) as it does to the agency decision
process, including ALJ performance. If the quality of the underlying
agency decision matters,21° and ALJs are our best administrative
deciders, then the 50%-plus district court reversal/remand rate for
SSA cases challenges conventional wisdom. All three branches
should be interested in this question.
1. The Supreme Court's Role: Tinkering with the Substantial
Evidence Test
The Supreme Court has long monitored the procedures
surrounding the SSA disability process. In Richardson v. Perales,1
the Court approved the use of written medical reports of doctors
over hearsay objections;2 2 in Mathews v. Eldridge," 3 the Court
established a due process balancing of interests test to permit
informal pretermination procedures in disability cases;2 ' and in
Heckler v. Campbell,2" it approved of the "grid" system that re-
moved some vocational issues from factual consideration by AJs. 2 1
These cases and others,217 demonstrate the Court's interest in
monitoring the procedural aspects of the disability process. It may
be time for the Court to take another case.
The next significant SSA disability decision by the Court might
deal with the substantial evidence standard of review. It has been
209. In comparison, the VA review system benefits both from an ideal claimant base (the
disabled veteran) and from a congressional review scheme that provides for a heightened
scope of review standard (clearly erroneous) plus a burden of proof standard that grants the
veteran a win in the case of an evidentiary tie (the benefit of the doubt standard). Yet even
with these plus factors, VA disability reversal/remand rates are still below those of the SSA.
Compare Koch & Koplow, supra note 102 at 226 (detailing SSA reversal rates), with supra
notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing BVA reversal rates).
210. See 1941 ADMIN. PROC. REP., supra note 1, at 91 (naming "Itlhe character of the
administrative agency" and "the confidence which the agency has won" as variables that will
influence the reviewing courts).
211. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
212. Id. at 402.
213. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
214. Id. at 334-35 (describing the three inquiries that comprise the balancing test).
215. 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
216. Id at 461-62.
217. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 112 (2000) (dividing five-to-four over whether issue
exhaustion is required in disability cases); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 145 (1987)
(upholding SSA's use of a minimum threshold of medical disability in denying benefits).
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more than fifty years since the Court defined the standard under
the APA in Universal Camera. That case, like the one that should
come next, dealt with deference to the fact-based decisions of ALJs,
or hearing examiners as they were then called. A new substantial
evidence case could be based upon an ALJ decision under the SSA
disability process. Such a case could have two goals. It could
emphasize the differences among scope of review standards outlined
here, and it could help restore substantial evidence as a deferential
standard."' The Court could also emphasize the connection between
accuracy and consistency of result in national programs like SSA
disability (or sentencing) by assessing agency attempts to structure
administrative discretion through management techniques and
rulemaking.
Such a case or cases would address the widely disparate federal
judicial outcomes on review of SSA decisions,219 and help relocate
primary responsibility for those decisions back in the hands of the
agency and its ALJs. As with the Court's decision in Koon, these
cases may not have immediate results, but could take hold over
time. Moreover, by shaping the dimensions of the substantial
evidence test in this context, the Court might also help Congress
decide whether it is necessary to consider other legislative alter-
natives.
218. One line of caselaw that might be reviewed is that of the Second Circuit which held
in Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986), that the treating physician's opinion is
entitled to controlling weight "unless contradicted by substantial evidence." Id. at 81; see also
Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing the Schisler summary as the
rule in the Second Circuit). This position was later modified by the Second Circuit after an
SSA rulemaking. See Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Pierce,
supra note 42, at 1116-17 (recounting the threat that the Second Circuit's "special rule" posed
to the NLRB and the "counter attack" the NLRB made in the form of a legislative rule). Since
not all circuits apply it, this rule both modifies the substantial evidence standard and
undermines the national reach of the program.
219. The percentage of judgments on the merits won by SSA claimants varies greatly by
judicial district, ranging from 2.3% in the Eastern District of Kentucky to 59.8% in the
Eastern District of New York. See Paul Verkuil & Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to
Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases: A Report to the Social Security Advisory
Board, App-A (2002), available at http'/www.ssab.gov (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
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2. The Role of Congress: Changing the Structure of Review
Pressure is building for Congress to consider legislative alter-
natives to district court review of disability cases. 220 Both the Long
Range Plan for the Federal Courts and the recommendations of
the Social Security Advisory Board raise the question of Article I
review. The Judicial Conference proposals postulate an Article I
review structure with limited judicial review along the lines of the
Veterans' Administration disability program,22' and the Advisory
Board discussed both Article I (Social Security Court) and Article III
(Court of Appeals for Social Security) alternatives. 22 At some point
Congress may feel compelled to act.223
SSA disability cases constitute a significant share of all federal
cases. During the twelve-month period ending September 30, 1999,
disability insurance and supplemental security income cases
constituted about 5.9% of all federal civil cases terminated by court
action.224 SSA disability cases are the largest category of cases
against the United States in the district courts, so if the federal
courts are looking to reduce their dockets, these are likely
candidates. However, the amount of district court trial time devoted
to these cases has been reduced due to the trend toward remands
rather than reversals225 and by the fact that district judges utilize
220. See id. at 57-59 (outlining proposals for an Article I at Social Security Court by
Congress and the Department of Justice). For arguments on both sides of the Article I Court
proposal, see id. at 61-62.
221. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1995).
222. SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE, supra note 100, at 61-62. The SSAB ultimately
concluded that it would not recommend an Article III Court of Appeals, but would "favor
serious consideration of an Article I Social Security Court." Id. at 67.
223. The Ways and Means Social Security Subcommittee has recently considered such
changes. See Social Security Court of Appeals Act of 1995, H.R. 1587, 104th Cong. (1995);
Social Security Procedural Improvements Act of 1993, H.R. 3487, 103d Cong. (1993); Social
Security Court of Appeals Act, H.R. 3265, 103d Cong. (1993); Social Security Procedural
Improvements Act of 1991, H.R. 2159, 102d Cong. (1991); Social Security Procedural
Improvements Act of 1989, H.R. 2349, 101st Cong. (1989).
224. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS: 1999 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, tbl. C-4 at 160-62 (1999) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIARY CTR.,
1999 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http'J/www.uscourts.govjudbus1999/contents.html. There
were 228,190 civil cases terminated of which 13,451 were Social Security disability cases.
225. In 1999, only about 0.15% of disability cases reached trial. Federal courts have been
backing away from all actual trials during this period as well. See Resnik, supra note 105, at
925 (documenting and lamenting a federal court trial rate of 8% in 1994). This trend has
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their magistrates to decide many SSA disability cases, which
further conserves judicial time.2 6
An Article I disability court system is of primary appeal from the
perspective of consistency of outcomes. Consistency is the greatest
need in mass justice situations where accuracy per se is a far
more elusive quest. Federal court review, on the other hand, is
balkanized; it can send inconsistent messages on the law and
frustrate evenhanded review on the facts. A single reviewing body
can set national standards much like the BVA has done for VA
disability cases. 27
There will be resistance to such a change.22 Claimants, most of
whom are now represented by attorneys,229 could be a strong po-
tential lobby against Article I review status for SSA disability
claims. Moreover, some of the uniformity argument can be
addressed through the creation of a special Article III appeals
court. This alternative, which is undesirable for other reasons,
might make an administrative structure a harder sell. Before
trying to reconceptualize judicial review, however, Congress may
be interested in whether the Supreme Court can unify district
courts through a "rejuvenated" substantial evidence test.
continued. As of September 30, 1999, the federal civil trial rate had reached 2.3%. FEDERAL
JuDicIARY CTR., 1999 ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 224, at 160.
226. Magistrates now decide over 40% of disability cases. This fact cuts two ways on the
question of Article III review, however, because magistrates are in effect Article I deciders
whose credentials are like those of ALJs.
227. The Social Security Article I Court idea is in fact premised upon the capacity to
produce "greater uniformity." SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE, supra note 100, at 23.
228. There should be no constitutional problem with Article I review, so long as Article III
courts retain jurisdiction over legal issues as the Federal Circuit does with VA disability
review. See supra note 137. Shifting from Article III review to Article I review, however, is a
much bigger step politically than changing from no review to Article I review as in the VA
disability situation.
229. SOCIAL SECuRITY ADMINISTRATION, APPROVAL oF CLAIMANT REPRESENTATIVES AND
FEES PAID TO ATTORNEYS (2001), available at http:J/www.ssa.gov/oig/adobepdf/A-12-00-
10027.pdf ("In Fiscal Year 2000, about 75% of disability claims had attorney representation.").
The SSAB has estimated that annual attorney fee payments in disability cases is over $500
million. See SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE, supra note 100, at 2. This could create strong
resistance to changing the system unless comparable payments are available under the new
system.
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3. Role of the Agency: Managing, Not Dictating, Outcomes
The Social Security Administration Office of Hearings and
Appeals (OHA) bears management responsibility for the disability
decision process. As we have discussed, during the 1980s, the OHA
aggressively sought to control the decisions of ALJs through their
own motion review of those judges with high reversal rates and
through the setting of caseload requirements.' After strong judicial
and congressional opposition to its tactics, OHA backed off its active
monitoring of AIJ performance. Today it does little to manage the
workload or outcomes of ALJs. 21 This has created something of
a policy vacuum. Expert policy leadership seems to have been
assumed by the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB). The SSAB
was created as an oversight body when the SSA became an
independent agency in March of 1995.2 But the SSAB, though
effective at the conceptual level, is not in a position to carry out
actual management reforms.
The SSAB has placed valuable emphasis upon the need for
reform of the disability hearing process, 2 especially by improving
the SSA-AUJ relationship.' It has also sought to rationalize the
role and workload of the Appeals Council, and to improve the
management of the state field offices that make the initial
decisions. 5 Strengthening the federal-state relationship in man-
aging the disability decision process is overdue. Hiring practices
among states need to be regularized and training and quality
assurance procedures improved.23 Federal guidelines improving
230. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Bellmon Amendment).
231. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
232. SSA, Social Security Online: History Page, available at http'J/www.ssa.gv/history/
keydates.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
233. SSAB, CHARTING THE FuTruRE, supra note 100, at 18-22.
234. The Board proposes to have the agency represented at the ALJ hearing, to close the
record after the AIJ hearing, and to certify claimant representatives according to a system
to be established by federal rules. Id. at 19-21. These are promising alternatives whose
economic effects need to be calculated.
235. See id. at 16-17 (outlining proposals to improve communication between the SSA and
state agencies and to make all states conform to federal standards).
236. Id. at 17. The federal government pays 100% of the costs of the program and could
take over the process. Id. at 16. That suggestion may be impractical in the short run given the
number of deciders involved and may be politically unattractive in the long run for the same
reasons. In the interest of avoiding delays in the process, one suggestion being actively
considered by the SSA is the elimination of the state reconsideration stage. Id. at 17-18. Of
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policy implementation need to be made controlling over state
deciders (and ALJs for that matter). Policy guidance would allow the
SSA to improve on the norms of consistency and uniformity and, by
so doing, gain the confidence of the reviewing courts.
B. Reassessing Freedom of Information Act Review
FOIA cases are hard if not impossible to explain in terms of
outcomes analysis if de novo is to be a meaningful standard of
review. An affirmance rate of almost 90% is indicative of a system
of review that does not inquire deeply into the underlying
administrative action, especially since there is no hearing below.23
1. The Supreme Court's Role in Setting the Tone
Searching review of FOIA cases depends upon the presence of the
de novo standard itself. Unless the Court becomes interested in
invigorating that standard, or even in acknowledging it, there is not
much point for it to act. Unlike Social Security disability review,
where the Court's guidance might be expected to moderate the force
of judicial intervention, a Court pronouncement on FOIA review
would likely have the opposite effect. The challenge is to make
district judges more curious about these cases so that they might
look behind agency affidavits. At this juncture, any change in that
regard is up to the other branches.
2. Congressional Alternatives
Congress could explore several ways to enhance review of FOIA
cases. The first is legislatively to acknowledge that the national
security exemption is never going to be subjected to the scrutiny
contemplated by de novo review.' Amending the review standard
to subject national security review to the arbitrary and capricious
course, given the recent fight in Congress over federalizing the airline security work force, it
would not be easy to convert state actors in disability cases into federal employees. See Juliet
Eilperin & Ellen Nakashima, Airport Security Accord Reached; Measure Calls for Federal
Screening Force, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at Al.
237. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (describing the unique quality of
Exemption 1 cases).
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standard once the classification process is completed would con-
form the review standard to reality. Indeed, in the tense security
environment we all face, such a modification seems particularly
justified.
Moreover, by acknowledging distinctions among the exemptions
in terms of review standards, the remaining exemptions might
achieve invigorated review simply by comparison. The exemptions
that retain de novo review might well be given a closer look.
Congress could also create an administrative review process that
would support and even supplant much of the work of the district
courts. An agency review process, staffed either by ALJs or other
qualified agency deciders, could couple the de novo standard with
increased in camera review. As Professor Grunewald has suggested,
this agency process could be operated by the Department of Justice
either on a consent basis or upon referrals from the district courts.239
These decisions might then be directly reviewed in the courts of
appeals,2" thereby reducing burdens of district courts.
A less ambitious alternative would be to create a conciliation or
ombudsman function to be administered by a separate admin-
istrative agency created to resolve FOIA cases or by the Department
of Justice itself.2" Because this approach would represent a shift in
emphasis away from the courts, Congress may not want to go this
far. Indeed, the requester community would likely resist any change
that moves away from de novo review. Finally, Congress could use
its oversight function to explore with agencies their approach to
FOLA review. By selecting the agencies with the higher FOIA
request caseload, some efforts could be made to ensure that these
agencies give their requests the prompt and fair responses they
deserve.
239. See Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1988) (describing administrative alternatives to court review in FOIA cases).
240. Id. at 43-44.
241. See id. at 45-48. Professor Grunwald concludes that ltlhe ombudsman function
proposed alternatively offers a meaningful prospect for meeting [the] needs" of review "in
many cases short of resort to adjudication but without restriction of the existing judicial
remedy." Id. at 65.
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3. Role of Agencies and the Department of Justice in Freedom of
Information Act Review
Much of what Congress might achieve at the agency level could
be achieved by the agencies themselves with assistance from the
Department of Justice (DOJ). One possibility would be to formalize
the FOIA ombudsman function either within agencies or within
the DOJ. The DOJ Office of Information and Privacy, which is
responsible for collecting statistics on FOIA cases, claims to support
the ombudsman concept.242 But there is little evidence that the
public is aware of the internal review possibility. The agency
receives only six to twelve requests for ombudsman review per
year,2" which is a tiny portion of the nearly two million requests
agencies receive annually or even of the approximately one million
that are denied. 2" A diligent search of the DOJ website fails to
reveal this function and groups that monitor FOIA decisions for
claimants, like Public Citizen, are unaware that the service exists.245
The DOJ Office of Information and Privacy could easily formalize
the ombudsman role within the agency and make it more generally
available. Of course, the ombudsman cannot correct ongoing cases,
but it can discern trends and problem areas at particular agencies
and recommend corrections to the process that can serve to avoid
the necessity for district court review.2
242. The DOJ website cites the study by Professor Grunewald on which his article was
based. DOJ, Focus on FOIA 'Ombudsman" Role, DOJ FOIA UPDATE, Fall 1987, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia-updates/VolVI11-3/viii3page2.htm (approving of the
ombudsman role, but noting that no formal mechanism has been adopted).
243. Discussion with Dan Metcalfe, Co-Director, DOJ Office of Information and Privacy
(Oct. 20, 2001).
244. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
245. Discussion with David Vladeck, Director of Litigation Group, Public Citizen (Oct. 25,
2001).
246. Cases that get dismissed before the district courts often result in the production of
requested documents. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. Under an ombudsman
regime, these cases need not be brought in the first place.
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CONCLUSION
This Article introduces a concept of outcomes analysis as a way
to understand and critique scope of review standards and to
determine their impact upon administrative and judicial behavior.
By postulating affirmance/reversal formulas for deciding cases
under the various standards, it presents a purely hypothetical
construct. Still, studying outcomes in selected high volume settings
probes whether Congress' will is being followed and helps to
establish predictive bases for deciding cases.
There is much that can be learned from this highly academic
exercise. The Court, Congress, and the agencies can use these
results to stimulate discussion and even to reconcile the application
of these standards to specific review situations. All of this can
be done while stopping far short of some mechanical application.
Judges are not automata, and cases are not sausages, but
consistency of application is still a worthy goal. This makes the
question of outcomes worth pursuing even-especially-some fifty
years after scope of review standards were first given new
articulation under the APA.
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APPENDIX A
Disposition Disposition Voluntary Stipulated AfM. in Part
Year Affirmed Reversed Dismissal Dismissal Rev. in Part
1990 251 17 32 62 26
1991 265 24 8 63 33
1992 204 15 13 42 13
1993 273 23 14 75 38
1994 286 17 20 98 18
1995 273 26 32 72 13
1996 275 14 27 61 18
1997 168 16 20 65 18
1998 230 20 13 74 15
1999 192 17 20 73 16
Total 2417 189 199 685-'_ 208
Dismissed Dismissed Failure to Failure to Dismissed
Year as Moot Sua Sponte Prosecute Serve by Court
1990 9 4 8 3 1
1991 9 2 16 3 2
1992 10 1 1 1
1993 9 5 7 1 1
1994 31 4 3 2 4
1995 9 7 13 - 2
1996 14 3 10 - 4
1997 8 3 2 - 1
1998 8 3 2 -
1999 5 2 6 - 1
Total 112 34 67 10 17
Exhaust Failure to Jurisdictional Dismissed Failure to
Admin. Name Defect Res State a
Year Rem. Party Judicata Claim
1990 12 1
1991 10 1 2
1992 4 2 2 2
1993 7 1 2 1 -
1994 9 1 1 2
1995 13 3 1




Total 78 8 12 3 4
Dis. Aff. + Vol. Dis. + Pro. Dis. + Stip. Dis. + 1/2 in part: 3611
Dis. Rev. + 1/2 in part + Stip. Dis. w/ costs: 432
Total Cases: 4043(432 of 4043 equals a 10.7% reversal rate)
247. 139 of the 685 stipulated dismissals were with costs.
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APPENDIX B
Exemption 1 Cases
Ex. 1 was the only
exemption:
Ex. 1 was one of
50 Dispositions Affirmed
several exemptions: 126 Dispositions Affirmed
24 Aff in part/Rev, in part
14 Stipulated Dismissals
Total Ex. 1 cases: 214 Dispositions Affirmed
Reversal rate excludes all cases where
Ex. 1 was the only exemption:
Reversal rate excludes all cases where
Ex. 1 was one of several exemptions:
(3561 total)
(3397 total)
432/3993 = 10.8%
432/3829 = 11.3%
